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VICTIMS

A Study of Crime in a Boston Housing Project

Deborah Blumin

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I. INTRODUCTION: D STREET AND THE D STREET SURVEY

The American public has witnessed a variety of governmental strategies for improving the quality of low-income housing--slum clearance programs, the construction of low- and high-rise public housing, urban renewal, urban rehabilitation and, more recently, "Model Cities." The failure of many of these programs to bring lasting benefits to their recipients probably reflects their common underlying assumption that improved housing, in itself, can eradicate many of the problems associated with poverty. Yet alcoholism, addiction, high rates of illegitimacy, unemployment, broken homes, and crime and delinquency have not yielded to the planners' bulldozers, and public housing projects have all too frequently become more visible slums. Moreover, these projects have often been regarded as "dumping grounds" for the "have-nots" of society, so that even the poor often find them undesirable.

A new interest in the problems and possibilities of public housing has emerged with the advent of the "war on crime." As public housing tenants have become more vocal about their needs, and recent statistical evidence supports their claims that the poor are more likely to be victims of crime than those in higher income categories,

efforts to control crime and delinquency have, to some degree, been directed toward project dwellers. The Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 has become a prime source of funds for such programs.

In 1970, the City of Boston was awarded a grant, known as the Vertical Policing Project, the purpose of which is to experiment with different methods of crime control in multi-story public housing. Two projects, D Street in South Boston and Bromley-Heath in Jamaica Plain, were selected for experimentation from a group of nine in the City which exhibited high recorded crime rates. Although Bromley-Heath soon committed itself to a program which would emphasize the development of a police sub-station and the training and deployment of a tenant security patrol within the project, the D Street tenant task force disagreed as to which were the major crimes occurring in the project and what were the most promising strategies for program implementation. For this reason, as well as to establish the potential for evaluation of whatever experimental programs would be developed, the Mayor's Safe Streets Act Advisory Committee decided to conduct a victimization survey among the D Street tenants. The present report is an analysis of the results of that survey.

* * *

The D Street Project, built by the State of Massachusetts in 1949, is composed of 27 three-story brick buildings and a one-story administration building. Two parking areas for residents and visitors are located within the Project, and six narrow streets separate groups of buildings from one another. (See map in Appendix I.) Within the Project there exists a public elementary school, composed of one large brick building and six "portables," for approximately 500 children in grades "kindergarten - 1" (four-year olds) through four. A Catholic church and rectory (which serves the dwindling Lithuanian population of the area) is still in operation within the Project, along with its parochial school (a building once owned by the Boston Public School System) for approximately 150 boys and girls in grades six through eight. At the time the survey took place, an entire building of D Street, consisting of 12 apartments, had been converted to a Multi-Service Center, another apartment elsewhere in the Project had become a Senior Citizens Center, and one other apartment had been converted to a Department of Public Welfare Office. A small but neglected tot-lot has been built, but virtually all other open areas behind and in front of the various buildings are covered with blacktop. One very large blacktop

area, where ballgames are occasionally played, covers a significant portion of the center of the Project. Visitors to D Street are impressed by the pervasiveness of blacktop areas in the Project, and by the virtual absence of any trees or grass. Broken glass and other debris litter much of its grounds.

Each of the twenty-seven buildings is divided into three sections of twelve apartments apiece, and each section has its own front and rear doors. It is impossible to move from one section to another within any building; rather, one must go out the front or rear door of one section and enter the front or rear door of the other section. None of these doors are locked, their windows are often broken and, in warm weather, they are generally kept open. Hallways are narrow and dark. There are no elevators or door-buzzer systems, and doors to the roofs are unlocked.

There is a sameness to the buildings of D Street which is broken only by the variations in the graffiti on their walls, by the varying numbers of broken window panes, and by the fact that some of the buildings are in better repair than others. There is more variation, however, in the interiors of the apartments themselves. Many of them are extremely clean and attractive, while others are

dirty and neglected. Some are barren of all but the most essential of furniture; others are crowded with mementos and decorated with considerable care. Nonetheless, the overwhelming atmosphere of D Street is that of dreariness, sameness and decline.

As is customary with most public housing, D Street stands physically apart from adjacent areas. But what of its population? How do the people of D Street differ from those living in the rest of Boston and in the immediate neighborhood of South Boston? According to the 1970 Federal Census, Boston, South Boston, and D Street have the following racial distributions:[1]

TABLE 1. RACIAL DISTRIBUTIONS: BOSTON, SOUTH BOSTON AND D STREET.

	BOSTON	%	SOUTH BOSTON	%	D STREET	%
WHITE	524,709	82	37,798	98	3,278	93
BLACK	104,707	16	388	1	173	5
OTHER	11,655	2	285	1	88	2
TOTAL	641,071	100%	38,471	100%	3,539	100%

[1]To preserve the confidentiality of respondents, the Census does not include data collected when there are less than six families on a block. These figures, therefore, are slightly lower than the real total. Furthermore, the Census reports a standard error of 60 per 1000 responses.

D Street's racial profile is much closer to that of its immediate neighborhood than to Boston as a whole. On the other hand, the small (5%) proportion of blacks in D Street may be regarded as significant in a section of the city which is nearly all white.

The age structure of the three areas, however, reveals considerably more variation between South Boston and D Street:

TABLE 2. AGE DISTRIBUTIONS: BOSTON, SOUTH BOSTON, AND D STREET.

AGE DISTRIBUTION	BOSTON	%	SOUTH BOSTON	%	D STREET	%
14 YEARS OR LESS	152,692	24	10,234	27	1,618	46
15-24 YEARS	138,182	22	6,314	16	548	15
25-34 YEARS	79,379	12	3,795	10	285	8
35-54 YEARS	126,208	19	8,389	22	587	17
55-64 YEARS	62,851	10	4,283	11	212	6
65 YEARS OR MORE	81,759	13	5,456	14	289	8
TOTAL	641,071	100%	38,471	100%	3,539	100%

46% of D Street's population is composed of children 14 years or younger, as compared to 27% and 24% for South Boston and Boston, respectively. Conversely, it has 14% of its population in the 55 or older category, compared to 25% for South Boston.

Table 3 shows that, with regard to sex distributions, there is little difference between either of the three areas.

TABLE 3. SEX DISTRIBUTIONS: BOSTON, SOUTH BOSTON AND D STREET.

	BOSTON	%	SOUTH BOSTON	%	D STREET	%
FEMALE	345,831	54	20,666	54	1,981	56
MALE	295,240	46	17,806	46	1,558	44
TOTAL	641,071	100%	38,488	100%	3,539	100%

However, combining sex and age reveals a sharper difference between D Street and both South Boston and Boston. All three areas show a preponderance of males 14 years of age or younger, and a tendency toward more females than males as age increases. Yet this swing is even more drastic for D Street, where there is a higher ratio of males to females in the youngest group and a higher ratio of females to males in the 25-54 age bracket. The latter is probably due to a higher proportion of female-headed households in D Street than in South Boston and Boston.

TABLE 4. SEX AND AGE DISTRIBUTIONS: BOSTON, SOUTH BOSTON, AND D STREET.

	BOSTON				SOUTH BOSTON				D STREET			
AGE DISTRIBUTION	MALE	%	FEMALE	%	MALE	%	FEMALE	%	MALE	%	FEMALE	%
14 YEARS OR LESS	77,558	26	75,134	22	5,278	30	4,956	24	864	55	754	38
15-24	61,496	21	76,686	22	3,067	17	3,247	16	259	17	289	15
25-34	39,158	13	40,221	12	1,888	11	1,907	9	82	5	203	10
35-54	59,308	20	66,900	19	3,957	22	4,432	21	213	14	374	19
55-64	26,901	9	35,950	10	1,781	10	2,502	12	66	4	146	7
65 YEARS OR MORE	30,819	11	50,940	15	1,835	10	3,621	18	74	5	215	11
TOTAL	295,240	100%	345,831	100%	17,806	100%	20,655	100%	1,558	100%	1,981	100%

To complete this rough sketch, let us look at the number and types of crimes occurring in D Street as recorded by the Police Department for 1969, the calendar year preceding the Project's inclusion in the Vertical Policing grant. They are grouped below, using the classification scheme of the Uniform Crime Reporting System developed by the F.B.I.

TABLE 5. 1969 POLICE STATISTICS FOR D STREET: PART I OFFENSES.

PART I OFFENSES	NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE	0
FORCIBLE RAPE	0
ROBBERY	5
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	8
BURGLARY	9
LARCENY	5
AUTO THEFT	35
TOTAL	62

Considering the fact that there are 958 households and a population in excess of 3,000 people, these figures certainly do not seem alarming. The burglary rate, in fact, is a rather low 12 per thousand households, and

there are no recorded homicides or rapes. However, the number of recorded auto thefts does seem high, considering that many urban poor do not own cars. Examination of Part II offenses reveals a somewhat different pattern:

TABLE 6. 1969 POLICE STATISTICS FOR D STREET: PART II OFFENSES.

PART II OFFENSES	NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES
SIMPLE ASSAULT	15
VANDALISM	60
NARCOTICS	0
DRUNKENNESS	15
DISORDERLY CONDUCT	0
TOTAL	90

The number of recorded incidents of vandalism is quite high--in fact, the highest recorded for any project in the City for 1969. Likewise, the number of simple assaults and arrests for drunkenness seems somewhat high.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that tenants' complaints center around children who break windows, harrass minority groups, vandalize autos, throw "Molotov cocktails," drink in hallways, and engage in generally destructive activity of the buildings and grounds. But

is it this sort of criminal activity, associated largely with juvenile behavior, which gets translated into deep fear among some tenants for their general safety? Or is it that the recorded crimes are merely the tip of the iceberg, and that if all the crimes that occurred were known, a picture would emerge of frequent serious criminal acts against the person and/or his property which justify tenant concern and demands for immediate intervention? We will see below that police records do not, in fact, provide a complete picture of crime in D Street, and that the issue of what actually happens to D Street tenants is a critical unknown. Our survey, therefore, has been directed towards discovering the real incidence and pattern of crime occurring in the Project.

The questionnaire was designed to achieve a number of goals:

(1) The development of more accurate victimization rates than Police records allow by overcoming two major sources of error: (a) under-reporting of incidents by tenants, and (b) under-recording by the police;

(2) an analysis of what kinds of crime happen to what kinds of tenants;

(3) a description of who is committing these offenses;

(4) a representative picture of the concerns and attitudes of the tenants with regard to crime;

(5) an analysis of the attitudes and the opinions of the tenants with regard to program alternatives to curb crime; and

(6) a profile of the characteristics of the "D Streeter" and an analysis of how selected characteristics are related to his experiences, behavior, and attitudes.

The questionnaire consisted both of open-ended questions and closed questions (ones in which response alternatives are provided), and usually took about 45

minutes to administer. All interviewers were trained and instructed to ask the questions exactly as written, to record responses to open-ended questions verbatim, and to probe only through the use of non-directive questioning, e.g., "What do you mean by that," "anything else," and other standard probes which do not suggest answers to respondents. All interviewers participated in a training session.[2]

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[2] The bulk of the interviews was conducted by the Survey Research Program of the Joint Center For Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University.

Only heads of households who had lived in the Project for at least one year were to be interviewed. In this way we could control the exposure to crime in D Street for all respondents for a standard period of time. Since many crimes may be considered crimes against all members of a family (burglary, breaking of apartment windows, and auto thefts), it was decided to interview one head of household when there was both a female and a male head, consensual or legal. In the case of joint heads of household, only males were to be interviewed; no substitution of the female head for the male head was to be allowed. This procedure assured us of a sufficient number of males in our study. Victimization data were collected only about those crimes which affected the selected head of household personally.

Three sampling strata were developed on the basis of "race." This strategy enabled interviewers to interview respondents of the same "race" and insured that black and Puerto Rican households, who comprised but a small percentage of the Project, would be included in the sample in sufficient number.

Using management lists, it was determined that, at the time of the survey, of the 972 apartments in the Project, there were 857 white, 41 black, and 38 Puerto Rican

households, or a total of 938 households eligible for interviews. (Eight households previously selected for a pre-test of the questionnaire, eight households which include members of the D Street Task Force informed of the survey, and six Filipino households were intentionally excluded from the study. Fourteen apartments had been converted to non-residential usage.)

As there were not many black or Puerto Rican households in the Project, it was decided to include all of them in the survey. However, for the 857 white households, a probability sample of 357 households was drawn in an effort to yield approximately 250 completed interviews. A table of random numbers was used as a basis of selection to ensure an unbiased sample of such households. The outcome of the field work is detailed below.

TABLE 7. RESULTS OF FIELD WORK.

	WHITE H.H.	BLACK H.H.	PUERTO RICAN H.H.
NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR INTERVIEWS	859	41	38
NUMBER SELECTED FOR INTERVIEWS	357 42%	41 100%	38 100%
TOTAL COMPLETED INTERVIEWS	242	20	23

TABLE 8. EXPLANATION OF SAMPLE ATTRITION.

	WHITE H.H.	BLACK H.H.	PUERTO RICAN H.H.	TOTAL
INELIGIBLE: LIVED IN PROJECT LESS THAN 1 YEAR	43	0	1	43
APARTMENT VACANT	13	1	7	21
RESPONDENT ILL	6	2	0	8
RESPONDENT "WRONG" RACE	4	4	2	10
REFUSALS	32	3	1	36
RESPONDENT NEVER CONTACTED	9	10	4	23
OTHER REASONS	9	1	0	10
TOTAL NOT INTERVIEWED	115	21	15	151

The most frequent reason for failure to collect interviews was the inability of the selected heads of household to meet the screening criteria for eligibility; i.e., to have lived in the Project for at least one year at the time of the screening. Forty-three of the 151 households selected but never interviewed were in this category. Another 21 selected households were vacated when the interviewer called. In 10 instances, the race of the respondent was inaccurately described by our lists. Despite innumerable call-backs to the heads of household, another 23 selected households were never contacted by the time interviewing came to an end.

To measure the success of our field work, a completion rate has been calculated for each of our strata. This completion rate is based on the proportion of those who actually were interviewed to those who were eligible for interview. In other words, the denominator (the number selected for interview) is reduced by those who had lived in the Project for less than one year, the vacant households, the seriously ill respondents, etc., but retains the serious sources of bias, i.e., those who refused as well as those who were selected but were never contacted.

TABLE 9. COMPLETION RATES.

	WHITE H.H.	BLACK H.H.	PUERTO RICAN H.H.
SELECTED FOR INTERVIEW	357	41	38
UNABLE TO BE INTERVIEWED	-74	-8	-10
ELIGIBLE FOR INTERVIEW	283	33	28
COMPLETED INTERVIEWS	242	20	23
REFUSALS	32	3	1
NEVER CONTACTED	9	10	4
COMPLETION RATE:	$\frac{242}{283} = 86\%$	$\frac{20}{33} = 61\%$	$\frac{23}{28} = 82\%$
REFUSAL RATE:	$\frac{32}{283} = 11\%$	$\frac{3}{33} = 9\%$	$\frac{1}{28} = 4\%$

Considering the fact that the field work involved low-income urban residents exclusively, the completion rate is very satisfactory for the white households. Obviously, however, we must be careful not to over-interpret analyses based on race. The numbers of blacks and Puerto Ricans are too small and, in the case of blacks, the interview completion rate too low, to support an intensive racial comparison.

The fact that three different sampling strata were utilized requires that we weight our results to restore each stratum to its true proportion of the D Street population. The weights are as follows: Responses by Puerto Ricans = 1, responses by blacks = 1.3, responses by white = 2.3. In effect, these weights increase the number of respondents to 598, of which 547 are white, 26 are black and 25 are Puerto Rican. Unless otherwise indicated, all of the survey results described below are based upon this weighted sample.

Because public housing is geared to those poor enough to meet the required financial standards,[3] it is often assumed that public housing projects are filled with very large families headed by females, the under-educated, blacks, and people who are "foreign" to the community in which they have been placed. Moreover, because they are poor, it is assumed that the most powerful explanation for their behavior and attitudes is their shared low-income status. That these assumptions are inapplicable to D Street may be quickly and easily demonstrated.

We have already seen that D Street is overwhelmingly white. We can now note that it is predominantly local, rather than out-of-state, and predominantly native, rather than foreign-born. 396, or 66% of the weighted sample were born in Boston, another 29, or 5% were born elsewhere in the Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, and another 45, or 8% were born in New England! 30 others are from other parts of the United States. All 26 of the blacks are native-born, with the largest number, 10, from the South Atlantic states, followed by 7 born in Boston.

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[3] In D Street, a state public housing project, a maximum income of $4750 for one or more adults with one minor child was the eligibility limit at the time of study. $200 was allowed for each additional child.

Not suprisingly, 24 of the 25 Puerto Ricans were born in Puerto Rico. 16 of the 98 remaining in our sample were born in Canada, 36 are from Western Europe (25 of which are from Ireland), 5 are from Eastern Europe and 17 were born in other countries.

Even the parents of those in our sample were predominantly American-born: 53% of our sample had mothers and fathers born in the United States. The single largest group of foreign-born parents came from Ireland: 120, or 20% of their fathers and 138, or 23% of their mothers came from Ireland. Canada accounted for another 39 (7%) and 44 (7%) of their fathers and mothers, respectively. Nearly all the rest came from other parts of Western Europe (61, or 10% of their fathers and 37, or 6% of their mothers) and Eastern Europe (25, or 4% of their fathers and 28, or 5% of their mothers). All but one of the 25 Puerto Ricans (4% of our sample) had both mother and father born in Puerto Rico.

Even stronger confirmation of the "local" aspect of these tenants is that, of those born in Boston or its Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (425, or 71% of the sample), all but 1 have lived their whole lives in the Boston area. Moreover, only some 11% of all respondents have

lived in the Boston area less than 10 years, and almost half of these are from Puerto Rico. Of course, it should be remembered that our sample has intentionally excluded those who have lived in the Project for less than one year at the time of the interview, so that those who were excluded could possibly have had shallower roots in the Boston area.

Of those in the sample, however, nearly half, 48%, have lived 5 years or longer in the Project, while 21% have lived in D Street at least 10 years. Approximately 49% of all whites, 68% of all Puerto Ricans, and 65% of all blacks in the sample have lived in D Street less than five years.

Although all the members of this sample have been in D Street for at least one year, this does not necessarily mean that all have remained in the same apartment throughout their occupancies. In fact, 159, or 26% of the weighted sample, have lived in more than one apartment, and of these 159, 10 have occupied more than two. Puerto Ricans are the most mobile group: 32% of the Puerto Ricans, as compared to 27% of the whites and 2% of the blacks, have lived in more than one D Street apartment.

What can we say about the composition of these sampled households? Are most of them very large and headed by

females, and are these heads of households mostly young to middle-aged? Our sample data indicate that, in fact, 192, or 32%, live alone! This includes seven blacks and one Spanish respondent. 107, or 18%, are two-person households, 60, or 10%, are three-person, and 40, or 7%, are four-person households. In short, 67% of all respondents live in households of four or less. Another 25% live in households consisting of 5 to 7 persons, and another 8% represent households of 8 or more. No blacks have households larger than 8, whereas 21 of the 547 white and 6 of the 25 Puerto Rican households consist of 9 or more persons. Of course, the size of these households is necessarily related to the physical design of the D Street apartments, which is geared to small households. Originally, the 972 apartments consisted of 4,657-1/2 rooms: 207 one-bedroom, 360 two-bedroom,264 three-bedroom, 93 four-bedroom, and 48 5-bedroom apartments. Since 1949, some apartments have had separating walls removed so that they could be joined to accomodate larger families. Nonetheless, such instances are few in number and the fact remains that 85% of the apartments were originally constructed to contain only three bedrooms or less.

Contrary to expectations, few of the sampled households are headed by very young people. Only two heads of

household are under 20 years; another 68, or 11% are between 20 through 29 years of age. 56% are in the "middle-age" bracket: 137, or 23%, range from 30 through 39; 136, or 23%, from 40 through 49; and 62, or 10%, from 50 through 59. Interesting is the proportion of the sample over 60 years of age: 108, or 18%, are 60 through 69, and another 78, or 13%, are 70 or older. (Seven respondents have no age recorded.)

With about 31% of the sample 60 or older, it is not surprising to note that 31% of the sample are widowed. In addition, 25% of the sample are currently married, 23% are divorced or didn't answer the question, 17% are currently separated, and 5% never married.

One finding is congruent, however, with a widespread assumption. Most heads of households are in fact female: 202, or 71% of all sample households.

The level of attained education varies considerably among the respondents. 191, or 32%, have completed 8 grades or less (8% have completed 6 grades or less), 220, or 37% have completed the first year of high school up to the last; 166, or 28%, have been graduated from high school, and 17, or nearly 3%, have 1 year or more of college. (5 respondents reported no education or other kinds than listed above.)

In sum, these D Streeters do not conform to the stereotype of the public housing dweller. It is true that they are all poor, or near-poor, and that most of their households are headed by women, but in other significant respects they differ from what common beliefs would have led us to expect to find. Most are locally-born whites of native-born parents. Most live in small or medium-sized households. Many have lived in D Street for a number of years. And a significant minority have received at least a high school education. The latter, in particular, leads us to speculate that some D Streeters may have once known more prosperous times, and that their present absence of means may reflect only their stage of life and not a lifetime of poverty.

How much crime occurs to D Streeters? We stated earlier that this is a question that cannot be answered by simply turning to police statistics. Accordingly, we have asked the members of our sample to describe the crimes that have occurred to them personally, and have built from their answers a more complete picture of their victimization.

All interviewed heads of household were presented with a series of questions describing criminal events and were asked to indicate if any of these events had happened to them during the twelve month period beginning June 1, 1970, the year immediately preceding the commencement of interviewing. Whenever the respondent answered in the affirmative, he was asked how many times that event had happened during the year, and was then questioned in some detail about the most recent event of each type.

Through the aggregation of these responses we can now describe the total volume and types of crime that occurred to the D Street sample for this time period. Crimes of fraud, forgery, drunkenness, narcotics offenses, prostitution and commercialized vice have been excluded from this study. By definition, homicide could not be included. For purposes of discussion, the responses have been

grouped into three categories: Crimes against the person, crimes not against the person, and crimes of property damage or destruction. (The reader is cautioned to keep in mind that we are dealing here with the relative frequencies of various incidents, and not the proportion of different victims of various incidents. Consideration of multiple victimization will be presented later in the report.)

Clearly, unsuccessful attempts at committing even serious crimes are not likely to result in much harm to anyone. Unlike the practice of the Uniform Crime Reporting system, therefore, the following discussion will separate attempts from completed crimes to more accurately assess the harm done to our victims. Let us turn first to crimes against the person.

TABLE 10. CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON, WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598.

CRIME	FREQUENCY	RATE PER 1000	RANK
RAPE	0	0	6
ATTEMPTED RAPE & SEXUAL ABUSE	5	12*	5
ROBBERY	13	22	4
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY	18	30	2
ASSAULT AND/OR BATTERY	151	252	1
LARCENY FROM THE PERSON	15	25	3
TOTAL	202	341	-

*This rate is calculated on the number of females in the sample.

It is clear that the number of assaults and/or batteries far exceeds all other types of crimes occurring against the person. Even though this category includes simple assaults, the rate of 252 per 1000 heads of household certainly demands our attention. Compared to this category, however, all other crimes against the person are relatively infrequent, and no rapes whatsoever are reported. Five cases of sexual abuse and attempted rape, however, are reported by the females in our sample.

It is probably true that crimes that arouse the most fear are those encounters which involve strangers. Unlike the crimes of assault and/or battery and rape discussed above, robbery and larceny from the person usually involve persons unknown to one another. It is therefore of interest to note that 13 robberies and 18 attempted robberies, and another 15 larcenies from the person (purse-snatching or pocket-picking) were reported by our sample.

TABLE 11. CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON, WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598.

CRIME	FREQUENCY	RATE PER 1000	RANK
BURGLARY	112	187	6
ATTEMPTED BURGLARY	212	355	1
AUTO THEFT	31	326*	2
ATTEMPTED AUTO THEFT	12	126*	4.5
LARCENY OF AUTO ACCESSORIES	12	126*	4.5
ATTEMPTED LARCENY OF AUTO ACCESSORIES	2	-	9
LARCENY FROM THE MAILBOX	136	228	3
OTHER LARCENIES	53	89	7
OTHER ATTEMPTED LARCENIES	21	35	8
TOTAL	591	-	-

*These rates are calculated on number of cars owned by sample.

Although the frequency of crimes against the person varies considerably by type of offense, the rates for nearly all types of crime not against the person are uniformly high. For example, even though the absolute volume of crimes involving autos appears quite low, the low incidence of automobile ownership brings the rate of this crime up to a level comparable with the others: 326 auto thefts and 126 attempted auto thefts per 1000. On the other hand, the amount of actual loss sustained is considerably less than this figure would imply, as 22 of the 31 autos actually stolen were recovered. Another 12 thefts of auto accessories were reported, a rate of 126 per 1000.

The security of the home is important to residents of public projects no less than to those who live in the suburbs. Although our respondents indicate that the number of burglaries was only half as great as the number of attempted burglaries, the fact remains that 112 households were illegally entered, a rate of 187 per 1000.

In addition, 136 incidents (228 per 1000) of thefts from mailboxes were reported by the respondents. As many of the D Streeters receive a large portion of their income through the mail, this is a more serious matter than might be the case for residents of other types of neighborhoods.

Crimes not against the person are, in summary, a frequent event for D Streeters. On the other hand, it should be noted that 40% of all such crimes were attempted, rather than executed crimes.

TABLE 12. OFFENSES OF PROPERTY DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION, WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598.

OFFENSE	FREQUENCY	RATE PER 1000	RANK
ARSON IN OR OUTSIDE APT.	79	133	5
VANDALISM OR ARSON OF MAILBOX	444	742	1
ARSON OR MALICIOUS DAMAGE OF AUTO	32	344*	3
WINDOWS MALICIOUSLY BROKEN	376	636	2
WALLS, DOORS OR INTERIOR OF APT. MALICIOUSLY DAMAGED	172	288	4
TOTAL	1103	-	-

*This rate is calculated on number of cars owned by sample.

By far the most prevalent, if not the most serious crimes in D Street are vandalism, arson, and malicious damage. The physical appearance of the D Street Project is testimony to this fact. Indeed, the amount of damage or destruction to apartments alone is nearly overwhelming: 376 incidents of deliberate window-breaking, 172 incidents of walls, doors or interiors of apartments damaged, and 79 instances of arson, in or directly outside the respondents' apartments! Another 444 incidents of deliberate breaking of locks of mailboxes or of setting fire to them were reported (these 444 incidents excluded those times when mailbox theft was known to have occurred). Moreover, cars were damaged or had fires set to them 32 times, a rate of 344 per 1000 autos.

In sum, a total of 202 crimes against the person, 591 crimes not against the person, and 1103 offenses of damage and destruction, or a total of 1896 incidents, were reported to have occurred to our weighted sample of 598 heads of household in a single calendar year! These figures speak for themselves, and even their reduction by the number of offenses which were merely attempts cannot alter the observation that crime is a major fact of life for the D Streeter.

It is important to note that this volume of crime far exceeds the statistics recorded by the police for the same time period. Table 13 compares the volume of crime as derived from our survey to the volume of crime contained in police records. Two downward adjustments were made to the former, based on the following considerations. First, in a recent survey, Philip Ennis utilized a panel to review reports of crime to determine whether these reports referred to bona fide crimes.[4] Using Ennis' study as a guideline, Table 13 adjusts our survey results downward by 20% to remove possible response error, even though we recognize that the police themselves never utilize such stringent procedures to confirm their complaint records. Secondly, our survey reports have been further adjusted downward for those crimes which occurred to D Streeters while they were outside of D Street. Even though no adjustments were made in the opposite direction either to correct for crimes which respondents forgot to report to interviewers, or for crimes which occurred in D Street to non-residents, and even though our first

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[4] Philip Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Report of a National Survey, May, 1967, pp. 3-4.

TABLE 13. COMPARISON BETWEEN SURVEY REPORTS AND POLICE RECORDS OF CRIME IN D STREET, JUNE, 1970 - MAY, 1971.

CRIME	NUMBER REPORTED BY 598 HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD	SAMPLE CRIME RATE PER 1000	NUMBER REPORTED MINUS ENNIS' "CORRECTION" FACTOR	"CORRECTED" RATE PER 1000	"CORRECTED" RATE REDUCED BY CRIMES OCCURRING OUTSIDE D STREET	NUMBER RECORDED BY POLICE FOR TOTAL D STREET POPULATION	POLICE CRIME RATE PER 1000
RAPE, INCL. ATTEMPTS	2	-	-	-	-	0	-
ROBBERY, INCL. ATTEMPTS	31	52	25	42	37	1	-
ASSAULT AND/OR BATTERY	151	252	120	201	167	18	9**
BURGLARY, INCL. ATTEMPTS	324	542	259	433	433	12	12
AUTO THEFT, INCL. ATTEMPTS	43	453	34	358	229	45	296***
ALL LARCENY, INCL. FROM PERSON AND ATTEMPTS	240	401	192	321	273	13*	7**
VANDALISM	1103	1844	882	995	995	29	30
TOTAL	1894	-	1512	-	-	118	-

* Larcenies include 1 theft from the person, 4 motor vehicle plate thefts, 3 thefts from the auto, 1 auto accessory theft, and 4 miscellaneous thefts.

** Based on D Street Population of those 15 years or older.

*** Based on projection from cars owned in sample to 958 households.

adjustment is probably too generous, the disparity between the results of our survey and official police statistics is still quite pronounced. Remember also that the raw number of events reported in our weighted sample of 598 represents only a portion of the 958 households living in D Street and, further, are events reported by only one head of each household.

Recorded crime statistics tell us that D Street is a relatively low crime area, yet the present findings demonstrate quite clearly that crime is prevalent in D Street. The danger of this disparity is that allocations of funds and services are generally made on the basis of official statistics. Assuming that this disparity may vary from one neighborhood to another, areas such as D Street, where the disparity is relatively greater, will probably be deprived of their fair share of resources.[5]

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[5]Confirmation of our survey findings of the disparity between recorded and reported crime in D Street can be found in a study jointly sponsored by LEAA and HUD, "Crime and Housing In the Metropolis: A Study of Residential Crime," Urban Systems Research and Engineering, Inc., Cambridge,Mass., forthcoming. To compare official police statistics to unreported crime, 18 police reporting areas (15 in Boston, 3 in Boston suburbs) were selected for study on the basis of their average official police burglary rates for the three year period, 1969-71. Six of these reporting areas were classified as "high" burglary rate areas (50 or more burglaries per 1000 households), six were rated "medium" (20-49 burglaries per 1000 households), and six were rated "low" (19 or fewer burglaries per 1000 households). Comparison of the recorded burglary statistics to unrecorded burglaries for these 18 areas reveal a marked difference in 2 of these 18 areas, both of which had been identified as "low" according to official crime statistics and high in terms of unreported crime. One of these two cases was the D Street reporting area.

There are three possible explanations for these marked differences: (1) response error; (2) failure of respondents to report offenses to the police; and (3) failure of the police to record all reported crimes. We have already applied a 20% correction factor to take into account item (1). A fuller discussion of the reporting behavior of our respondents, and of the recording of crimes by police, will be presented later in this report.

Quite beside the fact that the results of our survey indicate that the police data considerably underenumerate the amount of crime occurring to D Streeters in D Street, police data permit only a quantitative description of various crimes. Interviews, on the other hand, provide the opportunity to capture a more complete description of these incidents. Respondents, after having detailed how many and what kinds of offenses occurred to them within the year, were therefore asked to report about some of the characteristics concerning the last time that each of the offenses had occurred to them. This strategy was based on the following considerations: (1) So many incidents were expected to have occurred to a respondent that he could not be expected to describe the details of all of them; (2) it is believed that recall of the most recent event would be the most accurate; and (3) it is assumed that all such descriptions would be representative of the universe of crimes reported to the interviewers.

These descriptions include responses to questions about the time of day and location of the crime, the characteristics of the offender(s) (when known), and the decision to report the crime to the police. It is obvious that such information, when combined with knowledge

of the relative frequencies of various incidents, is extremely useful for the development of appropriate programs to reduce crime. Since for many readers the major interest of this investigation is its implications for the development of such programs, the discussion that follows is confined to those incidents which happened only to D Streeters within D Street boundaries.[6] (Crimes reported to have occurred outside of D Street are described in Appendix II.)

For example, it would be most efficient if security forces for an area could be synchronized, whenever possible, with the crime rhythms of a given area. In D Street, more incidents were reported to have occurred in the daytime than at night: of the 285 events in which the time was known, 57% were daytime occurrences. 46 respondents had no knowledge of when the event took place, and for another 16 no response was ascertained.

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[6]These incidents represent unweighted frequencies. The reader should bear in mind that these frequencies, and not the number of respondents, are the base for the following discussion.

TABLE 14. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY TIME OF OCCURRENCE.

	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON			CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON					PROPERTY DAMAGE/DESTRUCTION					
CRIME	SEX ABUSE ATT. RAPE	ROBBERY & LARCENY INCL. ATT.	ASSAULT AND/OR BATTERY	BURGLARY INCL. ATT.	AUTO THEFT INCL. ATT.	LARCENY AUTO ACCESS. INCL. ATT.	LARCENY FROM MAILBOX	OTHER LARCENY INCL. ATT.	ARSON IN OR OUTSIDE APT.	VANDALISM OR ARSON MAILBOX	VANDALISM OR ARSON CAR	WINDOWS MALIS. BROKEN	WALLS, DOORS, INTERIOR OF APT. VANDALIZED	TOTAL
DAY	0	4	13 45	26 44	0	1	19 73	8 67%	6 38	49 53	1	30 48	6 30%	163 47
NIGHT	2	3	14 48%	23 39%	7	4	2 8%	4 33%	10 62%	18 20%	6	23 37	7 35	123 35%
DON'T KNOW	0	0	0	10 17%	2	0	3 12%	0	0	22 24%	2	3 5	4 20	46 13%
NOT ASCERTAINED	0	0	2 7%	0	0	0	2 8	0	0	3 3%	0	6 10	3 15	16 5%
TOTAL	2*	7*	29 100%	59 100%	9*	5*	26 101%	12 100%	16 100	92 100%	9	62 100	20 100%	348 100%

* No percentages will be calculated in this table or subsequent tables when columns or rows have frequencies fewer than 10.

When crimes are broken down into categories, we find that those crimes involving autos are more likely to occur at night than any other offense category, whereas the reverse is true for larcenies from mailboxes (Table 14). It is not surprising that thefts from mailboxes should occur in the daytime before tenants collect their mail.

Although burglary, robbery, and larceny from the person are often regarded as crimes of stealth, they are, surprisingly, nearly as likely to occur in the day as in the night. The same observation is true for assaults. No clear pattern of different types of property damage and destruction, however, is evident, although this category of events as a whole is somewhat more likely to occur during the day.

It is also important to assess whether residents are likely to be victimized in locations amenable to surveillance and crime control. To locate the offenses in space as well as time, victims were asked in what kind of place in D Street the offenses occurred. In some cases, the location is inherent in the offense itself; e.g., burglaries are confined to apartments and autos are vandalized or stolen on the streets. Only in the category of crimes against the person and "other larcenies"

is our knowledge of the type of site, by definition, incomplete. Inspection of Table 15 indicates that the two cases of sexual abuse and attempted rape occurred in the respondents' own apartments, as compared to only 5 of the 29 assaults. Interestingly, nearly half (15) of the assaults described occurred on D Street grounds, while another 10 happened in the respondents' halls. Five thefts from the person occurred on D Street grounds, while another two occurred in the halls. Overall, 39% of our descriptions reveal that more crimes occur in and around the apartments of D Streeters (39% in their own apartments and 45% in their halls) than anywhere else. This is, of course, directly related to the preponderance in D Street of burglaries and vandalism in and outside of the apartments. Another 11% of the crime reported in the descriptions occurred on the D Street grounds.

The policy implications of the findings in this section will be discussed in the concluding section of this report.

TABLE 15. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE.

LOCATION	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON			CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON					PROPERTY DAMAGE/DESTRUCTION					TOTAL
	SEX ABUSE ATT. RAPE	ROBBERY & LARCENY INCL. ATT.	ASSAULT AND/OR BATTERY	BURLGARY INCL. ATT.	AUTO THEFT INCL. ATT.	LARCENY AUTO ACCESS. INCL. ATT.	LARCENY FROM MAILBOX	OTHER LARCENY INCL. ATT.	ARSON IN OR OUTSIDE APT.	VANDALISM OR ARSON MAILBOX	VANDALISM OR ARSON CAR	WINDOWS MALIC. BROKEN	WALLS, DOORS, INTERIOR OF APT. VANDALIZED	
OWN APT.	2	0	5 17%	58 100%	0	0	0 -	0 -	1 6%	0 -	0	63 100%	7 32%	136 39%
HALL OF OWN BLDG.	0	2	9 31%	0 -	0	0	26 100%	1 8%	14 88%	89 97%	0	0 -	15 68%	156 45%
PARKING LOT	0	0	0 -	0 -	4	2	0 -	2 17%	0 -	0 -	6	0 -	0 -	14 4%
D STREET GROUNDS	0	5	15 52%	0 -	4	2	0 -	9 75%	1 6%	0 -	3	0 -	0 -	39 11%
ELSEHWERE	0	0	0 -	0 -	1	1	0 -	0 -	0 -	3 3%	0	0 -	0 -	5 1
TOTAL	2	7	29 100%	58 100%	9	5	26 100%	12 100%	16 100%	92 100%	9	63 100%	22 100%	350 100%

It is not enough to count and categorize crimes, or to place them in time and space. Crimes are events, usually significant events, which happen to people. Consequently, one of our most important tasks is the identification of those who appear to be most susceptible to crime, as revealed in the patterns of victimization which emerge from our survey.

It is frequently assumed in areas where there is a high volume of crime that virtually everyone is being victimized. On the other hand, depending on the racial and age composition of the area, word-of-mouth discussion sometimes leads us to think that certain types of people, e.g., ethnic and racial minorities, the aged, may more frequently be the targets of crime than other groups. D Street is a case in point -- minorities and the aged are reputed to be especially vulnerable to crime.

Before we examine the personal characteristics of victims in D Street, however, we must determine just how unevenly victimization is spread among the members of our sample. This is accomplished in Table 16.

TABLE 16. MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION: WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598.

RESPONDENTS' REPORTS	NUMBER	PER CENT
NO VICTIMIZATIONS	230	41%
ONE VICTIMIZATION	97	18
TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	44	8
THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	185	33
	556*	100%

*Response not ascertained = 42

It is hard to say which is more startling -- that of the 1896 incidents reported in a calendar year by our respondents, 41% report none, or that another 41% of our respondents were victimized more than once! To say the least, crime is unevenly distributed in D Street, a fact which helps explain why casual stories of the amount of crime in D Street vary considerably, and which underscores the need for the systematic identification of victims.

More intensive examination of the amount of multiple victimization within the crime categories previously described may identify those kinds of crime which are more likely to contribute to the phenomenon of multiple victimization. As Table 17 indicates, multiple victimization

is much more characteristic of property damage and destruction than of either of the other two categories. Crimes not against the person, in turn, produce a greater proportion of multiple victims than do crimes against the person.

TABLE 17. PER CENT OF MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION BY CRIME CATEGORY: WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598.

NUMBER OF CRIMES	PER CENT AGAINST THE PERSON	PER CENT NOT AGAINST THE PERSON	PER CENT PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION
0	86%	66%	57%
1	8	14	15
2	2	7	6
3 or more	4	13	22
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Who, then, are the multiple victims? Are they primarily the racial minorities and the aged of D Street? With regard to the former, Table 18 indicates that the first of these common notions is partially substantiated:

Blacks have, in every single category of crime, a higher proportion of multiple victimizations than either the whites or Puerto Ricans. The greatest disparity between blacks and whites with regard to multiple victimizations is within the category of property damage and destruction, which also happens to be the locus of the highest percentage of multiple victimizations among Puerto Ricans. It is interesting that this category is characterized by intimidation rather than economic gain to the offender.

On the other hand, the Puerto Ricans exhibit the lowest proportion of multiple victimization, and, in fact, report the lowest proportion of crimes generally. There are several possible explanations for the low volume of crime generally reported by Puerto Ricans: (1) A greater unwillingness of Puerto Ricans to disclose such information, despite the use of Puerto Rican interviewers; (2) different patterns of living by Puerto Ricans which result in reduced victimizations; and (3) greater mobility among victimized Puerto Ricans than among others, leaving a smaller proportion available for interview (recall that respondents were required to live in D Street for at least 1 year to be included in this survey).

TABLE 18. NUMBER AND PER CENT OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY RACE AND/OR PUERTO RICAN NATIVITY WITHIN CRIME CATAGORIES: WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598.

	ALL CRIMES			CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON			CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON			PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION		
NUMBER OF CRIMES	WHITE	PUERTO RICAN	BLACK	WHITE	PUERTO RICAN	BLACK	WHITE	PUERTO RICAN	BLACK	WHITE	PUERTO RICAN	BLACK
0	200 39%	17 71%	13 50%	465 86%	24 96%	21 80%	352 65%	22 88%	18 70%	294 57%	18 75%	14 55%
1	94 19%	3 13%	0 -	44 8%	1 4%	1 5%	78 14%	2 8%	1 4%	83 16%	3 12.5%	1 5%
2	41 8%	1 4%	1 5%	7 1%	0 -	3 10%	37 7%	0 -	4 15%	32 6%	0 -	1 5%
3 OR MORE	170 34%	3 12%	12 45%	23 4%	0 -	1 5%	74 14%	1 4%	3 12%	110 21%	3 12.5%	9 35%
TOTAL	505 100%	24 100%	26 100%	539 99%	25 100%	26 100%	541 100%	25 100%	26 101%	519 100%	24 100%	25 100%

With regard to our second notion, the aged's vulnerability to crime, there would appear to be two major forces which run counter to one another: A greater inabilty for the elderly to defend themselves against crimes which occur in the victim's presence, thereby rendering them a more attractive target, and reduced availability to the offender because of the curtailment of activity associated with aging. As the latter, often overlooked, would appear to be a more critical factor, we would hypothesize that elderly experience less multiple victimization in all categories of crime, but that among those categories, they are more likely to experience multiple instances of property damage.

The hypothesis that the elderly are less likely to experience multiple victimization is confirmed in Table 19: Indeed, the elderly are least likely to ever be victimized. Moreover, the same table indicates that when multiple victimization does occur to the elderly, it is more likely to be a crime of damage or destruction. Despite these observations, however, it is quite possible that the smaller number of victimizations of the elderly may result in more psychological, physical and economic harm than if done to younger people who experience more crime.

TABLE 19. NUMBER AND PER CENT OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY AGE WITHIN CRIME CATEGORIES: WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598

	ALL CRIMES			CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON			CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON			PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION		
NUMBER OF CRIMES	19-39	40-59	60 OR OLDER	19-39	40-59	60 OR OLDER	19-39	40-59	60 OR OLDER	19-39	40-59	60 OR OLDER
0	75 40%	59 32%	94 53%	173 87%	166 84%	166 90%	113 55%	123 63%	152 81%	115 59%	92 49%	117 65%
1	36 19%	30 16%	32 18%	13 7%	19 10%	12 6%	38 19%	23 12%	21 11%	31 16%	31 17%	25 14%
2	9 5%	23 12%	12 7%	6 3%	1 1%	2 1%	26 13%	13 7%	2 1%	9 5%	15 8%	9 5%
3 OR MORE	68 36%	73 39%	41 23%	8 4%	12 6%	5 3%	27 13%	37 19%	12 6%	41 21%	49 26%	30 17%
TOTAL	188 100%	185 99%	179 101%	200 101%	198 101%	185 100%	204 100%	196 101%	187 99%	196 101%	187 100%	181 101%

To a certain extent, we may expect a different pattern of multiple victimization for females than for males, simply because females are usually more vulnerable to crimes against the person and probably spend more time inside the Project. Surprisingly, however, Table 20 indicates that there is no substantial difference between females and males in the incidence of multiple victimization. It is curious to note that the presence of male heads of household does not substantially reduce the proportion of multiple victimizations involving property damage, and that crimes against the person occur slightly more frequently to males than females.

Finally, we may hypothesize that those households living on the top and bottom floors of each building will be more vulnerable to burglary than those households living in-between. Recall that the rear, front and rooftop doors of D Street buildings are generally left unlocked. To this we might add that the first floor windows of D Street apartments are quite close to the ground. It is only logical to suspect that those apartments closest to various routes of entry will be most often burglarized. Table 21 confirms this suspicion.

TABLE 20. NUMBER AND PER CENT OF VICTIMIZATION BY SEX WITHIN CRIME CATEGORIES: WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598.

	ALL CRIMES		CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON		CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON		PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION	
NUMBER OF CRIMES	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
0	65 41%	165 41%	140 82%	369 88%	115 68%	277 66%	98 61%	229 56%
1	30 19%	68 17%	16 9%	30 7%	28 16%	54 13%	19 12%	68 16%
2	16 10%	28 7%	6 3%	4 1%	10 6%	30 7%	9 6%	24 6%
3 OR MORE	47 30%	137 35%	9 5%	15 4%	16 10%	61 14%	34 21%	89 22%
TOTAL	158 100%	398 100%	171 99%	418 100%	169 100%	422 100%	160 100%	410 100%

TABLE 21. BUILDING FLOOR BY NUMBER OF BURGLARIES AND ATTEMPTED BURGLARIES: WEIGHTED SAMPLE = 598.

NUMBER OF BURGLARIES, INCLUDING ATTEMPTS	FIRST FLOOR	SECOND FLOOR	THIRD FLOOR	TOTAL
0	133 72%	166 85%	170 78%	468 78%
1	22 12%	15 8%	22 10%	59 10%
2	12 6%	7 3%	10 4%	29 5%
3 OR MORE	18 10%	8 4%	16 7%	42 7%
TOTAL	185 100%	196 100%	218 99%	598 100%

In sum, crimes occur to no one easily definable group, and common notions of the extra vulnerability of racial minorities and the aged are simply false. Blacks are more frequently victimized than whites, but Puerto Ricans and the aged less frequently victimized than the whites and the young. Women are no less safe than men, and male-headed households are as likely to suffer from vandalism as female-headed households. Not everyone falls prey to crime in D Street in a given year, and no single group is entirely immune -- indeed the best prediction of victimization in D Street would appear to be previous victimization.

VIII. WHO IS THE OFFENDER?[7]

Efforts to control crime in high crime areas frequently take the form of treatment programs for would-be offenders. However, the systematic identification of offenders is seldom undertaken. To collect information to determine accurately who commits offenses in D Street, therefore, we asked our victims what they may know about those who committed crimes against them. Through this procedure we can hope to learn, for example, about whether or not most offenders are indigenous to D Street, whether they are young or old, male or female, and what prior relationships they may have had with their victims. We have also linked these characteristics with specific types of offenses, when our descriptions permitted such an analysis, so that this information could be useful for crime-specific programs.

Of course, one of the major barriers to the description and, for that matter, the apprehension of the offender, is that frequently the victim never gets an opportunity to see him: He comes from behind, it's too dark, or the victim simply is not at the site of the crime when it occurs. In fact, in 204 of the 348, or 58%, of our descriptions, the victims knew nothing about their offenders, and in another

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[7] This section of the report is based on the descriptions of the last time each type of offense had occurred in D St. to our victims.

8 instances, or 2%, no response was noted. Of the remaining 136 descriptions for which we have offender information, 55, or approximately 41%, involved an offender acting alone, while 81 involved offenders acting in a group. Half of the 136 descriptions involve property damage or destruction; another 24% are crimes not against the person, and 26% are crimes against the person. As might be expected, group offenses are most characteristic of property damage or destruction, and least characteristic of crimes against the person--73% of the former and 38% of the latter.

Most of the D Street offenders are male. As Table 22 indicates, 71% of all described offenders are male, acting either alone or in combination with other males, while 17% act in groups which include both sexes. Male offenders differ from female offenders not merely in number but also in their proclivity to act in groups consisting entirely of their own sex. Slightly more than half of those offenses committed entirely by males are committed in groups, while female offenders act most often in groups which combine both males and females. There is only one report of an all-female group (a case of window-breaking).

TABLE 22. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY SEX OF OFFENDER WITHIN SINGLE AND GROUP OFFENDER CATEGORIES.

	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON	CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON	PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION	TOTAL
SINGLE OFFENDER				
MALE	17 49%	13 40%	16 24%	46 34%
FEMALE	5 14%	1 3%	2 3%	8 6%
NOT KNOWN	0 -	1 3%	0 -	1 1%
TOTAL SINGLE	22 63%	15 46%	18 27%	55 41%
GROUP OFFENDERS				
ALL MALES	10 29%	12 36%	28 41%	50 37%
ALL FEMALES	0 -	0 -	1 1%	1 1%
MALES AND FEMALES	3 9%	4 12%	16 24%	23 17%
NOT KNOWN	0 -	2 6%	5 7%	7 5%
TOTAL GROUP	13 38%	18 54%	50 73%	81 60%
TOTAL	35 101%	33 100%	68 100%	136 101%

The bulk of these offenders are quite young.[8] The highest concentration of all offenders (and the majority of group offenders) is within the 12-16 age category, while the next highest lies between the ages of 17 and 20. Fully 17% are described as under 12! Unlike these youths, virtually all offenders over 30 commit their offenses alone, and about three-fourths of their crimes are offenses against the person.

We will recall that D Street (and South Boston generally) contains only a small proportion of minority groups in its population. Assuming that the bulk of the offenders do not travel from all over the City to D Street, it would be surprising if we were to find many non-white or Spanish-speaking offenders. Table 24 confirms this proposition. Whether an offender commits an offense alone or with others, he is very likely to be white. Victims described only 11% of all offenders as belonging to minority groups. Indeed, D Streeters seem to be specially cognizant of this fact. Many spontaneously offered to interviewers the observation,

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[8] Victims of group offenders were asked the ages of the youngest and oldest offenders. Table 23 does not include those for whom no age was ascertained.

TABLE 23. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY AGE OF OFFENDER WITHIN SINGLE AND GROUP OFFENDER CATEGORIES.

	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON		CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON		PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION		TOTAL
AGE OF OFFENDER	SINGLE OFFENDER	GROUP OFFENDER	SINGLE OFFENDER	GROUP OFFENDER	SINGLE OFFENDER	GROUP OFFENDER	
UNDER 12	2 9%	1 7%	0 -	1 4%	6 33%	16 27%	26 17%
12-16	0 -	6 43%	4 31%	15 63%	7 39%	33 55%	65 43%
17-20	1 4%	5 36%	4 31%	5 21%	3 17%	10 17%	28 18%
21-30	3 13%	2 14%	1 8%	2 8%	1 5.5%	1 2%	10 7%
OVER 30	17 74%	0 -	4 31%	1 4%	1 5.5%	0 -	23 15%
TOTAL	23 100%	14 100%	13 101%	24 100%	18 100%	60 101%	152 100%

TABLE 24. SINGLE AND GROUP OFFENDERS BY RACE OR NATIVITY OF OFFENDERS.

RACE OR NATIVITY	SINGLE OFFENDER	GROUP OFFENDERS	TOTAL
BLACK	6 10%	1 1%	7 4%
WHITE	56 84%	74 78%	130 81%
PUERTO RICAN	0 -	6 6%	6 4%
DON'T KNOW, NOT ASCERTAINED	4 6%	9 9%	13 8%
WHITE AND BLACK	-	2 2%	2 1%
OTHER RACE/ETHNIC COMBINATIONS	-	3 3%	3 2%
TOTAL	66 100%	95 99%	161 100%

"It's not the blacks causing the trouble here--it's the whites."

One of the most striking results of our inquiry into the characteristics of D Street offenders is the extent of their familiarity to their victims. Previous research informs us that crimes against the person often occur between individuals who are known, if not related, to each other. This pattern adheres in D Street, where fully 69% of the victims of crimes against the person recognize their offender(s). Surprisingly, however, the recognition rate for crimes not against the person and property damage and destruction is also quite high, 35% and 67%, respectively. Of course, it is possible that these figures would be reduced somewhat if all the offenders could be described by their victims. There is no reason to suspect, however, that this reduction would be very great. To a remarkable degree, therefore, we can conclude that crime is an "intimate" affair in D Street, often involving people who are not strangers to each other.

TABLE 25. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY NUMBER AND PER CENT OF OFFENDERS RECOGNIZED BY THEIR VICTIMS.

RECOGNITION OF OFFENDER(S)	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON	CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON	PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION	TOTAL
RECOGNIZED	17 49%	4 13%	15 22%	36 27%
SOME RECOGNIZED	2 6%	2 6%	13 19%	17 13%
ALL RECOGNIZED	5 14%	5 16%	18 26%	28 21%
NOT SURE	3 9%	8 25%	10 15%	21 16%
NEVER SAW BEFORE	8 23%	13 41%	12 18%	33 24%
TOTAL DESCRIPTIONS	35 101%	32 101%	68 100%	135 101%
PER CENT RECOGNIZED	69%	35%	67%	61%

It is not, however, a family affair. As Table 26 indicates, almost all crimes in D Street are committed by offenders who are not relatives of their victims. This is true for all crime categories, even for crimes against the person, where only 9% of the offenders are attributed to relatives. In the remaining two categories, the proportion of offenders related to their victims is negligible or nil, and, as in the case of offender recognition, there is no reason to believe that it would increase significantly if the large numbers of undescribed offenders could be identified.

Any proposal for D Street-based treatment programs for offenders poses a most critical question: Where are they coming from, D Street or outside? As we would expect, having observed the high rate of offender recognition, most offenders do come from D Street: In 66% of the descriptions for which there was offender information, the offender was reported to be from the Project. Property damage offenders were most often identified as D Streeters (72%), followed by crimes against the person (67%), and crimes not against the person (52%). It is not surprising that 24% of our respondents did not know whether the offender was an insider or not, even when they knew other

TABLE 26. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY RELATION OF OFFENDER TO VICTIM.

RELATION	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON	CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON	PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION	TOTAL
RELATIVE	3 9%	2 6%	0 -	5 4%
NON-RELATIVE	30 88%	27 82%	66 97%	123 91%
DON'T KNOW, NOT ASCERTAINED	1 3%	4 12%	2 3%	7 5%
TOTAL DESCRIPTIONS	34 100%	33 100%	68 100%	135 100%

TABLE 27. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY RESIDENCE OF OFFENDER.

PLACE OF RESIDENCE	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON	CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON	PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION	TOTAL
FROM D STREET	24 67%	17 52%	49 72%	90 66%
NOT FROM D STREET	4 11%	5 15%	5 7%	14 10%
DON'T KNOW	8 22%	11 33%	14 21%	33 24%
TOTAL	36 101	33 100%	68 100%	137 100%

characteristics of their offenders, as the total population of D Street is in excess of 3,500 persons.

We will discuss the implications of this pattern in the concluding section of this report. In the meantime, it will be interesting to investigate whether or not the high level of familiarity between offender(s) and victim affects the decision of the victim to file a report to the police.

In section V we noted a considerable disparity between our survey findings of the magnitude of crime in D Street and corresponding police statistics. Naturally, the decision to file a complaint with the police is indicative of the victim's desire to use legal channels to apprehend his offender(s) and/or recover his losses. Without this decision, the administration of justice seldom begins.

A frequent assertion made about D Streeters, however, is that their fear of reprisals from offenders deters them from filing reports to the police. Having established the fact that the majority of observed offenders are recognized by their victims as indigenous to D Street, it is logical to inquire to what extent the so-called "fear of retaliation" actually inhibits reporting crime to the police. Victims were therefore asked if they, or someone else, had informed the police of their victimizations and, if they had not, why they chose not to.[9]

Table 28 demonstrates that, in 63% of the crime descriptions, the crime was <u>not</u> reported. There is also a

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[9]To allow the respondent to feel comfortable in indicating that he had not notified the police, he was not asked, "Did you call the police?" Rather, the question read to him was, "Did you or someone else let the police know about this or didn't you happen to call?"

TABLE 28. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY NUMBER AND PER CENT OF VICTIM REPORTS TO POLICE.

REPORTS	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON	CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON	PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION	TOTAL
YES	14 37%	50 45%	49 25%	113 32%
NO	24 63%	57 51%	139 70%	220 63%
DON'T KNOW NOT ASCERTAINED	0 -	4 4%	12 6%	16 5%
TOTAL	38 100%	111 100%	200 101%	349 100%

considerable difference between the types of crimes committed and the level of reporting: Only 25% of the cases of property damage or destruction, as opposed to 40% of crimes against the person and 45% of crimes not against the person, are said to have been reported to the police. The fact that the first is so low is perhaps not so surprising, as many incidents in this category are less serious offenses in which there is little chance of apprehension or restitution. The very pervasiveness of these crimes in D Street, moreover, undoubtedly discourages reporting. What is alarming is the low reporting rate by victims of more serious crimes against and not against the person. Why did so many of these victims fail to report crimes to the police?

Surprisingly, few victims were deterred from calling the police because of the fear of retaliation. Table 29 indicates that this reason was given in only 9, (4%), of our descriptions. Further, despite the fact that a significant number of offenders are not strangers, and that many are also very young, only 5% did not call because of concern on the offender's behalf. Rather, the most frequently cited explanation, accounting for 52% of our responses, was that "the police couldn't do anything." This was a stronger factor in the categories of crimes not

TABLE 29. TYPE OF OFFENSE BY REASONS FOR DECISION NOT TO CALL POLICE.

REASONS	CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON	CRIMES NOT AGAINST THE PERSON	PROPERTY DAMAGE/ DESTRUCTION	TOTAL
FEAR OF RETALIATION	3 13%	2 4%	4 3%	9 4%
DON'T LIKE POLICE	0 -	0 -	1 1%	1 -
POLICE CAN'T DO ANYTHING	9 38%	32 56%	74 53%	115 52%
CONCERNED FOR OFFENDER	4 17%	1 2%	6 4%	11 5%
NOTIFIED D ST. MANAGEMENT	2 8%	8 140%	29 21%	39 18%
SETTLED ON OWN	3 13%	2 4%	2 1%	7 3%
NOT SERIOUS ENOUGH	2 8%	2 4%	6 4%	10 5%
OTHER REASON	1 4%	4 7%	11 8%	16 7%
NOT ASCERTAINED	0 -	6 10%	6 4%	12 5%
TOTAL	24 101%	57 101%	139 99%	220 99%

against the person and property damage or destruction than in the category of crimes against the person. It is possible that past performance of the police has disappointed the D Streeter, but it is also possible that this is a realistic assessment of the situation-- that it is unlikely that police charges will be levied or that the Courts will take action thought to be constructive by the victim.

Apparently, it is the feeling among our respondents that more direct action is likely to be taken by the Project itself: 18% notified the D Street management, rather than the police. This reporting pattern is perhaps explained by the fact that it is management that is supposed to repair vandalized property within D Street, and which has the power to expel "disruptive" tenants. These are functions that the police cannot perform.

In short, futility, not fear, discourages most D Street victims from reporting crimes that happen to them. Relevant to this feeling of futility is the question of whether or not arrests are actually made when crimes are reported. Table 30 compared the number of arrests made for various crimes to the corresponding number of crimes <u>recorded</u> by the police.

TABLE 30. NUMBER OF CRIMES AND ARRESTS RECORDED BY POLICE: JUNE, 1970 - MAY, 1971.

CRIME	NUMBER OF CRIMES	NUMBER OF ARRESTS
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE	3	3
FORCIBLE RAPE	0	0
ROBBERY	1	1
AGGRAVATED AND SIMPLE ASSAULT	18	7
BURGLARY	12	2
LARCENY	13	2
AUTO THEFT	45	16
NARCOTICS	0	0
VANDALISM	29	0
TOTAL	121	31

The results are mixed. Our survey notes that 1449 incidents (taking into consideration the conservative correction factors discussed in Section V) occurred to our sample of D Street residents alone. Recalling that our respondents claim to report to the police 32% of their victimizations, we may estimate that approximately 464 crimes were reported to the police during the year for our weighted sample of heads of household. We may therefore expect approximately 750 crimes to be reported for all heads of households in D Street in the year under inspection. In comparison with the survey estimates of crime, the 31 arrests noted in Table 31 appear to justify the judgment, "The police can't do anything."[10]

However, only a portion of reported crimes are actually recorded by the police, so that the proportion of arrests to recorded crimes is substantially higher (about one in four, or one in three, if we omit vandalism) than it would have been if reported crimes were used as the base. Of course, this only raises the question of why so few reported crimes are actually recorded. Surely

[10]It should not be assumed that the arrests were necessarily made for those crimes recorded in the same time period. Arrests may occur long after the year in which the offense occurred, although this is seldom the case.

some portion of this disparity can be attributed to a reluctance on the part of the police to record crimes that they know they cannot solve--in short, to the same sense of futility that our respondents have expressed.

If D Streeters have little faith in the effectiveness of law enforcement, it would be instructive to see what crime prevention measures they implement themselves. Our respondents were asked a series of questions related to crime prevention and personal protection and we have cross-tabulated their responses with the number of times each has been victimized in the past year. In this way we can determine not only the types and degree of self-protection but the interrelationship between that protection and crime experiences as well. Do those who have experienced multiple victimizations take more precautions than those who have experienced little or no crime? Or are they generally indifferent to such precautions?

When D Streeters were asked if they carry any protective devices when they walk anywhere within the Project during the daytime, 92% of our 523 respondents reported that they use no device whatsoever. (23 respondents who reported they do not go out during the day have been excluded.) 12% of those who have been victimized three or more times, however, do carry something, compared to 7% of those never victimized during the year. Even when respondents were asked if they carry some form of protection at night, the pattern of their responses remains the same--

most, 85%, do not carry anything, although usage nearly doubles from 8% in the daytime to 15% at nighttime. (This time, 91 respondents reported that they do not go out at night and have been excluded from this tabulation.) Interestingly, those with three or more victimizations are twice as likely to carry protection as those with no victimizations.

Many of the protective devices utilized on D Street grounds are not weapons in the usual sense, but are various "household articles," ranging from dogs to hair spray. Only one respondent admitted to carrying a gun in the daytime, and only five said they carry one at night. On the other hand, knives and tear gas are the second and third most popular defensive weapons for day and night.

Interestingly, 3% fewer residents carry protection when they leave D Street, either during the day or at night. In this situation, a gun is never reported to be taken during the day, while only one respondent carries a gun at night.

It is curious that only a minority of D Streeters carry some form of protection, despite the fact that 59% of our sample reported one or more victimizations in a single year. Nearly one-third of our 371 respondents

TABLE 31. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY REASONS FOR NOT CARRYING PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN D STREET AT NIGHT.

REASONS	NO CRIMES	ONE CRIME	TWO CRIMES	THREE OR MORE CRIMES	TOTAL
NEVER GO OUT ALONE	13 8%	0 -	7 19%	6 5%	26 7%
GO WHERE IT IS SAFE	2 1%	2 3%	0 -	2 2%	6 2%
DON'T WANT TO USE ANYTHING	17 10%	13 22%	2 5%	38 34%	70 19%
NO NEED TO USE ANYTHING	57 35%	22 37%	17 46%	24 21%	120 32%
PROTECTION WOULD NOT HELP	16 10%	5 8%	2 5%	9 9%	32 9%
NEVER THOUGHT ABOUT IT	39 24%	14 23%	9 24%	16 14%	78 21%
OTHER REASONS	3 2%	2 3%	0 -	9 8%	14 4%
NO ANSWER	15 9%	2 3%	0 -	8 7%	25 7%
TOTAL	162 99%	60 99%	37 99%	112 99%	371 101%

who do not carry any protection at night in D Street believe it to be unnecessary. 21% of those who were victimized three or more times expressed this opinion, as compared to 35% of those who reported no crimes. Closely related to this notion is the second most frequently offered answer, "I never thought about it," supplied by 21% of our sample. Nearly one-fifth reported that they did not want to use anything--nearly three times as many persons with three or more victimizations reported this reason than those with no victimizations.

Perhaps the low rate of self-protection by D Street residents is related to the fact that 86% of our respondents indicated they had experienced no crimes against the person, although the most prevalent type of crime within this category, assault and/or battery, occurs most frequently in the halls or on the grounds. This figure drops to 66% and 57% for crimes not against the person and property damage and destruction. The latter two categories of crime most frequently occur in residents' apartments. Does this mean, then, that our respondents will focus their attention on precautions for and inside their apartments?

19% of our respondents report they keep something in their apartment for protection, with those who have three or more victimizations twice as likely to report this fact than any of the others. Yet only two respondents out of 556 carry theft insurance for the contents of his apartment! We should bear in mind here that we are talking to poor people who have insufficient means to protect their homes, and in some cases, have little worth protecting. Their responses support this fact: 34% report they do not buy insurance because it is too expensive, and an equal proportion report they had never thought about it. 17% express the thought that they have nothing valuable to insure, whereas 7% report they were unable to obtain insurance.

However, when respondents were asked if they would purchase insurance if it were reasonable, 40% indicated they would. Furthermore, those who had experienced at least one victimization were considerably more willing to buy insurance than those with no victimizations.

Though virtually no one in D Street carries home insurance, many D Streeters have implemented devices and patterns of behavior to protect their apartments from the possibility of illegal entry. Approximately one-quarter

of our sample have put locks on their doors in addition to what was already provided. Approximately the same proportion have thought about getting, or already have, a watchdog. About one-fifth have put locks or bars on their windows. The most frequently used measure, however, is to leave lights on at night when no one is home--nearly four-fifths report they follow this practice. Some even leave them on in the daytime as well. Other less frequently employed devices involve placing sofas and chairs against the door and leaving radios on. Sometimes the need for protection is felt in the extreme: Some respondents indicated that they keep their windows nailed shut, summer as well as winter, talk loudly when alone so that others will think a group of people are home, or arrange for at least one person to be at home all the time so that their apartments are virtually never empty. Clearly, the threat of crime can exact a very heavy toll.

Sometimes people will, however, overstate their security-mindedness. To determine actual as well as reported behavior among our respondents, interviewers were asked to record whether a respondent 1) had locks which appeared to be in working order; 2) had peepholes in their doors; 3) had the apartment door closed; 4) used a security

chain when they first spoke to the interviewer; and 5) asked the interviewer for proof of identification before admitting her into the apartment.

Interviewers reported that only 1% of our sample have locks which are clearly not in working order. However, only 11% have peepholes, and those with three or more victimizations were reported to have them three times as frequently as those with no victimizations, and twice as frequently as those victimized once or twice.

Interviewers reported that 15% of our respondents actually did not have their apartment doors shut. Interviewing was done during the day and this rather disturbing practice appears to occur because mothers have children going in and out and do not want to be continually opening the doors for them.

71% of our respondents either do not have security chains on their doors or did not make use of them when the interviewer called. The use of security chains does not vary by the number of victimizations of the respondent.

Judging from the fact that only 5% of our interviewers were asked for identification, it would appear that D Streeters are not terribly suspicious of strangers, although some interviewers felt that the ease with which they were permitted inside was related to the fact that they were nearly all women.

To some extent, the fact that some D Streeters nail their windows shut while others leave their doors ajar is explained by the uneven distribution of crime in the Project. That is, multiple victims tend to take more precautions than non-victims or victims of a single crime. Recognizing the fact that there is a thin line between paranoia and the implementation of reasonable precautions, the data nonetheless do seem to suggest that, to some degree, D Streeters ought to be made more aware of some of their daily behavior patterns which might well invite victimization.

XI. SOME D STREET OPINIONS ON CRIME AND CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS

We have explored the number and types of crimes that have occurred to our respondents and the legal and preventive measures they have taken in response to them. We have not yet, however, given D Streeters a chance to express themselves generally about crime and life in D Street.

Crime, of course is only one aspect of life in D Street. To determine its significance to D Streeters, respondents were asked, before the subject of crime was ever raised, whether or not, on the whole, they like living in D Street. The sample was split on this question: 57% responded that they like it, 43% that they do not. Moreover, responses such as those below suggest that the positions the tenants take on D Street can be quite extreme:

> "I do like the fact of just paying my rent, heat, gas all one bill--it's a wonderful relief for me. I thank God for living in a nice building, bright, clean apartment, no roaches, very nice people in building."
>
> (57 year-old divorced white female)

Compare this response to the following:

> "I don't like the building and I don't like the project. I don't like the maintenance service and it's cold here in the winter. Halls are filthy. Living here is really like living in a concentration camp. Kids are hanging in the halls and drinking beer."
>
> (49 year-old divorced white female)

Significantly, (and without reference to crime by the interviewer) among those who do not like D Street, 9% of the responses referred to the Project as unsafe; another 8% of the responses referred to vandalism as a source of displeasure; 4% pointed to drinking in the Project as a problem; and 12% referred to "the kids as nuisances."[11] Those who like the Project on the whole endorsed the above items with nearly the same frequency, except that the Project was referred to as "unsafe" in 6% of the responses. The distribution of negative responses, both for those who like and those who dislike D Street, appear in Tables 32 and 33, respectively.

One respondent who doesn't like D Street explained her dislike solely in terms of crime:

> "I don't like the atmosphere. It's dangerous, you live in constant fear. It isn't taken care of properly. The vandalism is terrible."
>
> (71 year-old widowed white female)

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[11]Responses exceed the number of respondents answering these questions as each respondent was permitted a maximum of three responses.

TABLE 32. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY NEGATIVE RESPONSES, AMONG THOSE WHO LIKE LIVING IN D STREET.

NEGATIVE RESPONSES	NO VICTIMIZATIONS	ONE VICTIMIZATION	TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	TOTAL
SOCIAL FACTORS	21 9%	4 6%	5 14%	3 2%	33 7%
ACCESSIBILITY	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF APARTMENT OR PROJECT	127 54%	49 68%	23 62%	78 58%	277 58%
KIDS ARE NUISANCES	33 14%	2 3%	4 11%	13 10%	52 11%
VANDALISM	25 11%	4 6%	3 8%	11 8%	43 9%
DRINKING	5 2%	4 6%	2 5%	6 4%	17 4%
PROJECT UNSAFE	12 5%	0 -	0 -	18 13%	30 6%
POOR LIGHTING	8 3%	2 3%	0 -	4 3%	14 3%
OTHER REASONS	6 3%	7 10%	0 -	2 1%	15 3%
TOTAL	237 101%	72 102%	37 100%	135 99%	481* 101%

*Responses exceed the number of respondents answering the questions as each respondent was permitted a maximum of three responses.

TABLE 33. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY NEGATIVE RESPONSES, AMONG THOSE WHO DO NOT LIKE LIVING IN D STREET.

NEGATIVE RESPONSES	NO VICTIMIZATIONS	ONE VICTIMIZATION	TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	TOTAL
SOCIAL FACTORS	22 15%	8 7%	4 9%	28 10%	62 11%
ACCESSIBILITY	3 2%	0 -	0 -	4 1%	7 1%
PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF APARTMENT OR PROJECT	74 51%	65 55%	29 63%	124 46%	292 50%
KIDS ARE NUISANCES	13 9%	19 16%	2 4%	34 13%	68 12%
VANDALISM	11 8%	5 4%	2 4%	31 11%	49 8%
DRINKING	0 -	9 8%	4 9%	13 5%	26 4%
PROJECT UNSAFE	14 10%	13 11%	5 11%	21 8%	53 9%
POOR LIGHTING	2 1%	0 -	0 -	4 1%	6 1%
OTHER REASONS	6 4%	0 -	0 -	11 4%	17 3%
TOTAL	145 100%	119 101%	46 100%	270 99%	580 99%

*Responses exceed the number of respondents answering the questions as each respondent was permitted a maximum of three responses.

Another, focusing on the same problem, said:

> "D Street is a jungle. People are programmed from the day they're born to the time of death (conditioned by the project). Kids play in glass and dirt; a half-mile away is the ocean but they don't use it. There's nobody to direct them. Parents are no help, the Service Center is just a joke. Fear--constant fear. I've had 125 windows replaced here in 2 years."
>
> (29 year-old white male)

But another respondent, who favors the Project, said:

> "There's no real trouble here. The kids make noise and all that, but there's no real trouble. My part of the building has a pretty good view. See out the window--there's the Prudential, and the only tree on the street is in front of one of my windows."
>
> (79 year-old widowed female)

It is interesting to note the relationship between the number of victimizations and the general attitude toward D Street: 59% of those victimized 3 or more times, as compared to 28% of those reporting no victimizations in a year, did not like living in D Street.

Whether respondents like or dislike the Project in general, both show a trend to channel positive preferences into strictly utilitarian concerns. Among those who dislike the Project, this trend is even more marked:

TABLE 34. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY POSITIVE RESPONSES, AMONG THOSE WHO LIKE LIVING IN D STREET.

POSITIVE RESPONSES	NO VICTIMIZATIONS	ONE VICTIMIZATION	TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	TOTAL
SOCIAL FACTORS	90 25%	18 15%	9 23%	27 16%	144 21%
ACCESSIBILITY	71 19%	22 19%	2 5%	35 21%	130 19%
PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF APARTMENT OR PROJECT	61 17%	29 25%	8 20%	33 20%	131 19%
PROJECT SAFETY	3 1%	2 2%	0 -	0 -	5 1%
CHEAP RENT	37 10%	14 12%	5 13%	24 14%	80 12%
UTILITIES INCLUDED IN RENT	51 14%	21 18%	4 10%	21 12%	97 14%
GOOD HEATING	34 9%	5 4%	7 18%	11 7%	57 8%
OTHER REASONS	20 5%	7 6%	5 13%	18 11%	50 7%
TOTAL	367 100%	118 101%	40 102%	169 101%	694* 101%

*Responses exceed the number of respondents answering the questions as each respondent was permitted a maximum of three responses.

TABLE 35. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY POSITIVE RESPONSES, AMONG THOSE WHO DO NOT LIKE LIVING IN D STREET.

POSITIVE RESPONSES	NO VICTIMIZATIONS	ONE VICTIMIZATION	TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	TOTAL
SOCIAL FACTORS	19 20%	4 7%	7 29%	7 5%	37 12%
ACCESSIBILITY	18 19%	4 7%	2 8%	14 11%	38 12%
PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF APARTMENT OR PROJECT	13 13%	10 18%	0 -	31 23%	54 18%
PROJECT SAFETY	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
CHEAP RENT	19 20%	16 29%	8 33%	29 22%	72 23%
UTILITIES INCLUDED IN RENT	11 11%	14 25%	3 13%	23 17	51 17%
GOOD HEATING	12 12%	2 4%	2 8%	18 14%	34 11%
OTHER REASONS	5 5%	5 9%	2 8%	10 8%	22 7%
TOTAL	97 100%	55 99%	24 99%	132 100%	308* 100%

*Responses exceed the number of respondents answering the questions as each responsdent was permitted a maximum of three responses.

51% of their positive responses referred to utilitarian aspects of the Project (23%, the rent was cheap; 17%, the utilities were included in the rent; and 11%, the heating was satisfactory), compared to 34% of the responses of those who like the Project (12%, the rent was cheap; 14%, the utilities were included in the rent; and 8%, the heating was satisfactory). It seems quite clear from the responses that both kinds of tenants are keenly aware that they could not be decently housed on the private housing market with their current levels of income.

A large majority (86%) of all respondents indicate that they feel either very safe or reasonably safe when alone in the Project during the daytime. Unsurprisingly, fear of one's safety is associated with the number of times respondents have been victimized: 23% of those with 3 or more victimizations, compared to 10% of those with no victimizations, feel either somewhat unsafe or very unsafe.

Respondents' sense of safety, however, is considerably reduced when alone at nighttime in D Street. 43% feel very unsafe and 16% feel somewhat unsafe at night, compared to 6% and 8%, respectively, during the day.

Respondents were also asked several questions designed to determine whether fear of crime in D Street modifies

their behavior. Only a small proportion of respondents (16%) ever stay home during the day because of fear of crime, and only 4% do so "very often." But 29% report staying home at night "very often," and another 10% report staying home at night "frequently" because of crime. Those with three of more victimizations are most likely to stay home at night because of fear.

The stress of fear is also evident in the fact that 17% of our sample report that, in the past year, they had "frequently" or "very often" not been able to sleep because of the fear of being victimized. This was reported nearly three times as often among those most frequently victimized.

It comes as no surprise, then, to note that 53% of our respondents answered in the affirmative to the question, "Is there so much crime in D Street that you would move if you could?" Another 5% indicate they are not sure of whether or not they would move. Significantly, an increase in desire to move accompanies an increase in the respondents' number of victimizations.

* * *

TABLE 36. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY DESIRE TO MOVE FROM D STREET.

DESIRE TO MOVE	NO VICTIMIZATIONS	ONE VICTIMIZATION	TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	TOTAL
YES	55 24%	40 41%	29 66%	109 59%	233 42%
NO	160 70%	54 56%	15 34%	68 37%	297 53%
DON'T KNOW	15 7%	3 3%	0 -	8 4%	26 5%
TOTAL	230 101%	97 100%	44 100%	185 100%	556 100%

Knowledge of community preferences for change, based on a representative cross-section of that community rather than a small but vocal leadership, can often be a crucial element in effective planning to control crime. For this reason, the D Street respondents were asked their opinions about (1) legal aspects of prevention and crime control as they currently perceived them in operation in D Street, and (2) the desirability of implementing certain programs aimed at curbing crime.[12]

With regard to police treatment of offenders in D Street, nearly three-quarters of our respondents (74%) either "disagree" or "strongly disagree" that the police are "too hard on the adult offenders." 15% of our sample express no opinion on this issue. Contrary to expectations, there is a slight tendency that, as a respondent's number of victimizations increases, he is more likely to think that the police are too hard on offenders. When respondents were asked about police treatment of youthful offenders, a slightly higher proportion of our respondents, 77%, either

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[12]Several of these questions were phrased in a negative manner to overcome a possible response pattern of acquiescence.

"disagree" or "strongly disagree" that police are too hard on offenders.

However, D Streeters are less likely to endorse harsher punishment by the courts to adult offenders: 56% "strongly agree" or "agree" that the courts should give longer sentences. But those with no opinion on the question increase to 24%. The respondents are even more lenient, as well as more divided, on the question of sentences issued to youths: 49% "strongly agree" or "agree" that courts should give longer sentences to them, but 34% "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with this statement. Those with no opinion drop to 16% of the sample. There is no strong association between the number of times victimized and responses concerning the leniency of the courts.

The severity or leniency of the police and the courts usually lies beyond the control of D Street residents. But tenants can have some measure of influence over certain kinds of crime control programs. As many of the D Streeters have experienced thefts from or vandalism of their mailboxes, respondents were asked if they felt that tenants needed a central mailbox center rather than individual mailboxes. The tenants are split on this issue, with a bare majority, 51%, "disagreeing" or "strongly disagreeing" with this

suggestion. 8% of our respondents express no opinion. Perhaps the fact that D Street is rather large raises concern about the possible inconvenience, particularly in bad weather, of such an arrangement. Yet many residents of other projects have, in effect, resorted to such a practice by renting mailboxes in Post Offices near their projects. Again there is no strong relationship between victimization experiences and responses to this suggestion.[13]

As we noted previously, entrance doors to D Street are usually unlocked, at night as well as during the day. Tenants were asked if they thought the practice of locking doors after dark would help to reduce crime. Repondents were evenly divided in their opinions: 46% "strongly agree" or "agree" that it would help, whereas 45% do not, and an additional 9% have no opinion. Responses did not vary by number of victimizations.

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[13] Although the above questions have not revealed an association with victimization experiences, those with three or more victimizations do seem to express more extreme opinions on both sides of these questions--that is, they strongly agree or strongly disagree, while those with fewer victimizations simply agree or disagree. Perhaps their experiences give them a sense of greater expertise on the subject.

Many communities have implemented police "substations," either to facilitate crime reporting or for use by tenant patrols. D Streeters were asked if the availability of such an office in D Street, run by a D Streeter and a policeman, would result in tenants reporting more crime. 29% of our sample indicated they did not know what effect such an office would have. 48% indicated that people would report more crime, while 22% said it would not make any difference. Of the reasons given by the 267 respondents who thought more reporting would result from such an office, the most frequently mentioned observation (27% of all responses) was that the substation would be closer to the residents. This is somewhat surprising, as a police station now exists but a block away from one corner of the Project. (19% of those with three or more victimizations offer this response, compared to 32% of those with no crimes.) Another 25% feel that a substation would be more likely to "get results," (the police would get there more quickly, the office would get more involved, etc.) and therefore people would be more likely to report incidents. This is a particularly interesting response in light of our earlier observation that many members of our sample claim "the police can't do anything." Perhaps a police substation would alter

TABLE 37. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY REASONS PEOPLE WOULD REPORT MORE CRIME TO A D STREET SUBSTATION.

REASONS	NO VICTIMIZATIONS	ONE VICTIMIZATION	TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	TOTAL
TRUST TENANTS MORE THAN POLICE	11 10%	2 3%	2 8%	14 12%	29 9%
SUBSTATION WOULD BE MORE SYMPATHETIC	11 10%	9 14%	0 -	20 17%	40 13%
SUBSTATION WOULD BE CLOSER	35 32%	23 36%	7 27%	22 19%	87 27%
MORE LIKELY TO GET RESULTS	25 23%	19 30%	7 27%	29 25%	80 25%
OTHER BENEFITS	9 8%	6 9%	3 12%	19 16%	37 12%
NO ANSWER ASCERTAINED	19 17%	5 8%	7 27%	14 12%	45 14%
TOTAL	110 100%	64 100%	26 101%	118 101%	318* 100%

*Responses exceed the number of respondents answering these questions as each respondent was permitted a maximum of two responses.

this attitude. Finally, two other frequently offered responses involve the element of trust: "The officer would be more sympathetic and would know the tenant" (14% of all responses), and "tenants would trust other tenants in the substation more than they do the officers in the existing police station" (10% of all responses).

In contrast, those who claim that tenants would not report more crime if a substation were implemented, provide varied arguments in support of this position. The most frequently endorsed argument (43% of all responses) is that people are afraid to report because of fear of retaliation. Perhaps the respondents are anticipating the loss of anonymity which the citizen usually enjoys when he files a complaint to the local police station. Or perhaps this is an expression of the myth of "fear of retaliation" which, we have observed, does not significantly affect behavior. Worth noticing is the fact that another 14% of the respondents state that "tenants don't want to get involvedwith other tenants." 14% also indicate that tenants simply "do not care," and a substation would not change this situation. Table 38 displays the distribution of these responses by the number of victimizations.

TABLE 38. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY REASONS PEOPLE WOULD NOT REPORT MORE CRIME TO A D STREET SUBSTATION.

REASONS	NO VICTIMIZATIONS	ONE VICTIMIZATION	TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	TOTAL
FEAR OR RETALIATION	21 44%	12 75%	2	19 40%	54 45%
TENANTS DON'T CARE	5 10%	2 13%	0	9 19%	16 13%
PEOPLE ORDINARILY REPORT TO POLICE	2 4%	0 -	0	2 4%	4 3%
TENANTS DON'T LIKE OTHER TENANTS	7 15%	0 -	5	5 10%	17 14%
OTHER REASONS	9 19%	2 13%	2	6 13%	19 16%
NO ANSWER ASCERTAINED	4 8%	0 -	0	7 15%	11 9%
TOTAL	48 100%	16 101%	9 -	48 101%	121* 100%

*Responses exceed the number of respondents answering the questions as each respondent was permitted a maximum of two responses.

Respondents were also asked whether a salaried tenant patrol in D Street, which would report to the police the crimes they observe on patrol, would significantly reduce crime. 47% of our respondents believe a tenant patrol would not make any difference at all, 21% believe it would reduce crime significantly, and another 30% believe it would reduce crime somewhat.[14]

Finally, tenants were asked to offer their ideas of what they thought could be done to make D Street a safer place to live. The responses of the D Streeters to this question warrant closer attention, particularly by the program planner. For this reason, Table 39 has preserved the details of all responses under appropriate headings. As shown below, more than one-third of our respondents' suggestions focus on police services and, in particular, the desire for more police than is currently provided. At present, the Boston Police Department has, in addition to the usual service provided by District 6 in which D Street is located, a unit called the Boston Police Public Housing

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[14]It has been said that very few D Streeters would be interested in serving on such a patrol. Yet when asked if there were any adults in the respondent's household who the respondent thought would want to be on a tenant patrol, 10% said "yes."

TABLE 39. NUMBER OF VICTIMIZATIONS BY SUGGESTIONS FOR A SAFER D STREET.

SUGGESTIONS	NO VICTIMIZATIONS	ONE VICTIMIZATION	TWO VICTIMIZATIONS	THREE OR MORE VICTIMIZATIONS	TOTAL
POLICE					
MORE POLICE	73 20%	32 20%	10 16%	49 16%	164 19%
FOOT PATROL	32 9%	21 13%	7 11%	20 7%	80 9%
CANINE PATROL	0 -	4 3%	0 -	12 4%	16 2%
OTHER POLICE PROTECTION	16 4%	3 2%	4 6%	25 8%	48 5%
TOTAL SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICE	121 33%	60 38%	21 33%	106 35%	308 35%
YOUTH					
BETTER RECREATIONAL FACILITIES	15 4%	16 10%	9 14%	23 8%	63 7%
IMPLEMENT CURFEW	14 4%	0 -	1 2%	17 6%	32 4%
DISCIPLINE HOOKEY PLAYERS	4 1%	2 1%	0 -	0 -	6 1%
MORE PARENTAL CONCERN	16 4%	7 4%	2 3%	28 9%	53 6%
PARENTS PAY FOR CHILDRENS' DAMAGE	2 1%	4 3%	0 -	12 4%	18 2%
OTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUTH	16 4%	5 3%	4 6%	7 2%	32 4%
TOTAL SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUTH	67 18%	34 21%	16 25%	87 29%	204 24%
PHYSICAL SECURITY					
INSTALL PEEPHOLES	12 3%	4 3%	0 -	3 1%	19 2%
INSTALL LOCKS AND CHAINS	11 3%	2 1%	0 -	11 4%	24 3%
LOCK HALL DOORS AT NIGHT	4 1%	2 1%	0 -	7 2%	13 1%
MORE OUTDOOR LIGHTS	6 2%	2 1%	1 2%	14 5%	23 3%
IMPROVE HALL LIGHTS	16 4%	4 3%	1 2%	12 4%	33 4%
MORE LIGHTS GENERALLY	30 8%	17 11%	7 11%	19 6%	73 8%
OTHER PHYSICAL SECURITY	12 3%	4 3%	4 6%	2 1%	22 2%
TOTAL SUGGESTIONS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY	91 24%	35 23%	13 21%	68 23%	207 23%
OTHER SUGGESTIONS					
TENANTS ORGANIZE	0 -	2 1%	2 3%	5 2%	9 1%
SCREEN, REMOVE UNDESIRABLE TENANTS	20 6%	5 3%	2 3%	4 1%	31 4%
NO CRIME PROBLEM EXISTS	8 2%	0 -	2 3%	2 1%	12 1%
MISCELLANEOUS	25 7%	7 4%	6 9%	13 4%	51 6%
TOTAL OTHER	53 15%	14 8%	12 18%	24 8%	103 12%
DON'T KNOW	16 4%	5 3%	2 3%	5 2%	28 3%
NO ANSWER ASCERTAINED	11 3%	10 6%	0 -	11 4%	32 4%
TOTAL	359 97%	158 99%	64 100%	301 101%	882* 101%

*Responses exceed the number of respondents answering the question as each respondent was permitted a maximum of three responses.

Division. This Division, consisting of 55 patrolmen, 8 sergeants, and 1 captain, is designed exclusively for foot patrol in selected public housing projects in Boston. Its primary purpose is to supplement the Department's crime control efforts in public housing by providing high visibility and the capability to canvas areas where motor vehicles have limited utility. At the time of the survey, one officer was assigned to D Street on a daily basis from 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., two officers were assigned to patrol every evening from 5:30 p.m. to 2:00 a.m., and three additional officers, one of whom was acting in a supervisory capacity, had been assigned to D Street on Friday and Saturday evenings from 8:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. (Interestingly, the Boston Police Department's headquarters for the Public Housing Division is housed in the District 6 police station.) Curiously, 9% of our respondents propose the implementation of foot patrols in D Street, which would suggest that some tenants, at least, have not been made aware that such patrols do exist.

Quite possibly, the D Street Project, primarily composed of white Irish, traditionally a well-represented ethnic group in the Boston Police Department, is predisposed to favor the police as a solution to their problems.

Says one respondent:

> "We should get all the people into an assembly hall and have the chief of the precinct come and talk to everybody. About police problems--what the people can do to help--how to do it. You know, police have problems, too. They're human."
>
> (35 year-old white married male)

Another respondent offers a similar thought:

> "People working together--cooperate with each other--main thing nobody wants to get involved. Police can do so much. Need help from public."
>
> (62 year-old white widowed female)

Some respondents, however, are not so favorably inclined.

Says one:

> "The police should come when they are called. When I called them that time they came to the door two weeks later and asked if I had called them. I had to laugh."
>
> (48 year-old white widowed female)

The next most frequently offered category of suggestions from the sample, including 24% of all responses, is directed at D Street children and youth. Unlike the tendency for the non-victim as well as the victim to suggest police programs with equal frequency, there is a significant association between the number of victimizations and the tendency to suggest changes directed at youth, indicating, perhaps, that

victimization increases awareness of the very large number of crimes committed by youths in D Street.

Physical security receives as much attention from our respondents as does the D Street youth. 23% of all responses refer to aspects of physical security specifically, and 62% of all responses within the category of physical security concern problems of lighting. Due to vandalism, many hallways from time to time are, in fact, completely dark at night, a situation likely to intimidate even the most brave.

It is hard to dispute D Streeters' opinions that there are a limited number of police in D Street, that there is inadequate lighting, and that limited opportunities exist to channel youths into legitimate behavior. It remains to be seen whether programs adequate to the challenge will be developed. Or is a lack of effective action going to confirm the following pessimistic assesment of the opportunities for change in D Street?

> "There isn't too much you can do--it's too late....D Street has a bad name and we have people from all walks of life thrown together--we're bound to have trouble. Because some people will not watch their own, they say, 'leave it to the next guy'."
>
> (66 year-old white male)

XII. Conclusions and Recommendations

In the preceding sections we have found that crime is indeed a serious problem in D Street--that, in fact, recorded crime statistics present merely the tip of the iceberg. At the same time, we have established a baseline for evaluating the quantitative and qualitative changes which might occur in D Street as various programs are implemented. Only through the use of comparative crime data can we expect to learn whether the desired and expected results from these programs actually occur. Our research findings, however, can be used not only for evaluative purposes, but as a basis for planning the very "programs" intended to improve life for D Streeters in the short-run. It is the purpose of this concluding section to address some of the possibilities for such improvements.

We have learned, for instance, that burglary is one of the most frequent and serious crimes occurring in D Street. Even after applying several conservative adjustments to our survey data (see Section V of this report), burglary, including attempts, was reported to have occurred at a rate of 433 per 1,000 households. Further, the fear of this crime in D Street has provoked numerous precautionary efforts. Nearly one of every five households keep household articles handy for protection, while one of five also report putting locks or bars

on their windows. One of every four households have put additional locks on their doors, and four of five households leave lights on at night when no one is home. Some protective measures, however, are better than others. Efforts should be made, therefore, to educate the tenants as to which deterrent measures are most effective. Keeping in mind that nearly 25% of all tenant suggestions for improvements in D Street focused on improving physical security, it is strongly urged that communications between the Boston Housing Authority and D Street tenants be established to facilitate the purchase and approval of effective locks and other security measures.

Despite the high incidence of burglary, only two respondents in our weighted sample carry home insurance. 34% report it is too expensive, and 7% report they were unable to obtain insurance. As 40% of all our respondents indicated they would purchase insurance if it were reasonable, efforts should be directed to distributing information and educating all tenants about the insurance currently available through the Federal Insurance Administration of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Designed precisely for those who live in high crime areas, this program enables tenants to secure residential insurance with minimum coverage of $1,000.00 for $40 a year, and a maximum of $5,000.00 at $70

per year. Coverage is subject to a deductible of $100 for each loss occurrence or 5% of the gross amount of the loss, whichever is greater. Mail theft, loss of money or checks, and jewelry are excluded from coverage. However, the knowledge that a considerable portion of one's property is insured can do much to reduce the anxiety about crime and considerably minimize losses if such a crime were to occur.

A high rate of thefts from mailboxes was also reported by our respondents. After using conservative correction factors, the rate of thefts from mailboxes remains at 182 per 1,000, an uncomfortably high figure, considering that many tenants receive social security and welfare checks through the mail. To date, no foolproof mailbox has been developed, and it would seem unwise to have mail deposited inside the apartments as this would probably just increase the number of burglaries. It does seem reasonable, however, to suggest that Social Security and Welfare offices consider the possibility of staggering the mailing of their checks. As it is now, everyone knows the mailing schedule for these checks and people in projects necessarily represent a target as they are known to be more likely to be receiving them. If instead, people were randomly assigned two different days a month, only the recipient would know when a check ought to

be in his box. Moreover, there could be several beneficial side-effects to such a procedure. One consequence could be that stores around areas where there are high concentrations of welfare recipients could not so easily increase prices around "check day." Secondly, the undesirable social effects associated with "check day," such as heavy drinking, which frequently leads to disturbances of the peace and assaults, could be more effectively absorbed if checks were not all received simultaneously. This would be beneficial to the police as well as to the tenants, some of whom have come to dread "check day." To be sure, the administrative changes necessary to implement such a reform would be considerable, but the long-range benefits, both psychological and economic, should make it worthwhile. Certainly, it would be desirable to experiment with a sample of recipients to determine its cost and its effectiveness.

Our survey underscores the extensiveness of vandalism, arson, and maliscious damage in D Street. 1,103 offenses of damage and destruction were reported to have occurred to our weighted sample of 598 households: 376 instances of deliberate window-breaking, 172 instances of damage to walls, doors or apartments, 79 instances of arson in or directly outside apartments, 444 instances of deliberate breaking of mailbox

locks or arson of the mailbox, and 32 instances of car damage. This volume of damage or destruction and the disfiguration of the physical environment which accompanies it is difficult for the middle-class resident to imagine. It would be comforting to think that people can get "accustomed" to living in a turbulent setting such as the one that often exists in areas of D Street. Unfortunately, many, many tenants do not. Frequently, tenants reported chronic nervousness and inability to sleep through virtually an entire summer due to youths and adults drinking outside the building and in the halls or racing cars through the Project. Extreme difficulties can be endured from the breaking of windows--one retarded child, for example, was reported to have been continuously ill through the winter because of the excessive drafts in the apartment due to broken windows. Because of our concern with the need to provide police patrols to prevent serious crimes and apprehend felons, it is easy to ignore the importance of and justification for police patrols to maintain public order and to preserve property on a daily basis--not merely in acute riot situations.

Much of what has been described about the offenders indicate that the D Street youths, particularly from ages 12 through 16, commit a significant portion of these kinds of

offenses. There has always been a tendency among the police and the courts to dismiss or treat lightly incidents of vandalism and disturbances as acts of "troublemakers" rather than serious delinquents. It would seem, because of the extensiveness and intensiveness of this conduct in D Street, that this policy, though perhaps helpful to youth, exists at considerable cost to the tenants. Accepting the fact that harsh punishment and institutionalization of youths is seldom therapeutic, it does nonetheless seem to be appropriate and desirable from the point of view of both victim and offender to see that youths are required, as a condition of release by the courts, to do compensatory work in D Street by repairing or cleaning areas they have damaged. To be effective, of course, there must be supervision to see that work assignments are in fact satisfactorily completed.

A prior task, perhaps, is the acquisition of more precise information about the relationships between the D Street youths and the criminal justice system. We have already indicated that the records kept by the Police Department do not adequately reflect the amount of crime occurring in D Street. But what about those youths who have police contacts but who are only reprimanded or warned? What of those who <u>are</u> brought to the station house but receive a station house adjustment,

i.e., never formally arrested? How many are there and what kinds of offenses do they commit? Are the same individuals repeatedly warned and informally dismissed? And of those who are arrested, what kinds of judicial dispositions are made for what types of offenders and for what kinds of offenses?--in short, how is justice administered for those who are alleged to have committed crimes in D Street? Efforts to gather such information would be most useful in assessing the operation of the justice process in D Street.

Given the large numbers of children in D Street, the virtual absence of recreational facilities, and the fact that vandalism often originates in boredom, it is hardly surprising that there are so many offenses of destruction in D Street. Surely there is much that can be done by the Boston Parks and Recreation Department to give D Street youths more constructive and less harmful outlets for their energies. Improved facilities and organized recreational programs are only the most obvious. D Street youths could also be trained and hired to participate in the building and maintenance of the facilities themselves. And youth clubs in contiguous areas should be urged to reach out to the D Street youth in an effort to unite the upper and more cohesive end of South Boston with the lower end where D Street is located.

The above proposals are aimed at the control of specific crimes. Other measures can be implemented to increase security from crime generally. For example, there is an acute need for clarification of the role of the police, housing management, and tenants in the control of crime. It is proposed, therefore, that D Street management, tenants, police, and maintenance personnel institute regular meetings to share and communicate their respective problems and mobilize efforts for collective action. Too often agencies and residents are unaware of ways they can complement, rather than inadvertently hamper, each other's efforts. Particularly since a large number of tenants' complaints of theft and vandalism are reported directly to the D Street management office, it would seem desirable, for example,to exchange information among these interested parties to determine exactly what is happening in D Street. Through regular meetings, tenants could also be educated by the Police Department about how to facilitate police responses. For example, when should tenants call the Boston Police Public Housing Division? When should they call the "regular" local Police Station? And when should they use the emergency police number? Citizens who are particularly concerned about retaliations should also be informed of their right to file a complaint

anonymously, even though it freqently may be more desirable for the police to have the name of a witness. Tenants should also learn to ask the name of the officers who receive their complaints, so that if the tenants do not get what they feel is a satisfactory response, they can call back and facilitate clarification.

Efforts should also be made to determine and communicate to management and tenants how the Boston Police Public Housing Division and the "regular" Boston Police Department delegate their respective responsibilities in D Street, how and when they communicate significant events that occur in D Street, and how these events are communicated between shifts. Moreover, to increase satisfaction with police performance, tenants and police should discuss the functions that the police can be realistically expected to perform to minimize any suspicions or unwarranted expectations that tenants may hold about police performance. The police, for example, cannot be expected to "cure" the social ills of D Street. They cannot remove so-called "undesirables" without legal cause, or turn dogs on mischievious children. They cannot make arrests for misdemeanors not committed in their presence. And perhaps, when a tenant calls about a relatively unimportant event during peak hours, he should be told <u>then</u> not to expect the police within 5 minutes!

In order to maximize the effective coverage by the police in an area such as D Street, where there are large areas of blacktop among buildings that cannot be reached by patrol cars, it is suggested that the police use motor bikes or bicycles to canvas the Project. Not used since the turn of the century, bicycles reappeared in New York City in August, 1971, to combat assaults of bicycle riders in Central Park. In March of 1972, bicycle patrols were implemented in Baltimore to avoid advance warning by the noise of engines and allow the canvassing of areas ordinarily inaccessible. Said one officer on bike, "They can't hear us coming and they don't know where to look for us."[15] Although police were initially met with derision by some tenants and expressed concern about dogs as a potential problem, both tenants and dogs have come to accept bicycle patrolmen with favor, and crime was reported down 50 per cent on the four beats where bicycles were used. The introduction of bikes in D Street would permit greater coverage than foot patrols allow, yet still permit the personal contact between the police and tenants which tenants believe to be desirable.

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[15] Homer Bigart, "Police Patrol on Bicycles Sharply Cuts Crime in Baltimore Alleys," The New York Times, Sunday, August 6, 1972.

Although we are in no position to evaluate the performance of the police in D Street, it is clear that a significant number of D Streeters feel it is inadequate. It is suggested, therefore, that the Police Department review their assignment policies, procedures, and personnel in D Street to assure that these citizens are getting the necessary and appropriate services. It is further suggested that the policemen assigned to high crime areas such as D Street be recognized by the Department as performing a vital role for the Department and the city.

As important as it may be to increase the effectiveness of police surveillance, D Streeters should be alerted to the fact that the best and most efficient surveillance of a residential area is still its residents. They know if a stranger is entering their neighbor's apartment or tampering with a mailbox. As many tenants may be home all or much of a day, they can look out of front windows to check throughout the day to see that nothing is awry. Tenants often do not realize that they could just as easily sit by a window as anywhere else. Remembering that 57% of all described incidents occurred during the day, and that 84% of these incidents occurred in apartments or halls, increased tenant surveillance could have been a substantial preventive effect.

Any of the described activities which we believe could be productive to the general welfare of the Project are, of course, desirable in themselves, but they are also invaluable in building a feeling of hopefulness among the tenants that improvements are possible and that tenants can really contribute to their own solutions. After all, these proposals are based on a careful consideration of the very responses of the tenants. We have noted, however, in the course of analyzing these data, that there are feelings of suspicion towards other tenants which are expressed in the myth of retaliation. It is important to realize that when one is likely to be victimized by someone in one's very own neighborhood, rather than by a stranger, there is good reason for many tenants "not to want to get involved." Community organization is difficult to realize in this kind of a setting. It is, therefore, encouraging to find that nearly half of the tenants are amenable to and optimistic about instituting such programs as mailroom centers, police substations, and tenant patrols.

As the focus of this study has been upon victimization, certain important crimes were not specifically addressed in the questionnaire. Drug addiction, for example, was excluded because it is generally regarded as a victimless crime. Yet we should not ignore the fact that numerous respondents

spontaneously mentioned that D Street youths are increasingly experimenting with glue-sniffing, hard drugs and a variety of amphetamines and barbiturates. Respondents frequently told interviewers that they have seen resident youths drinking and taking pills in hallways and have been distrubed by loud drug parties being held at night in the Project. Although we cannot quantitatively describe the extensiveness or intensiveness of this problem, it is certainly evident that some drug problems do exist and that it is imperative to know more about them.

Furthermore, since our respondents were queried only about crimes that happened to them personally, we did not inquire into the incidence of criminal homicide in D Street. It is critical, however, that the reader be alerted to the fact that although no criminal homicides were recorded by the Police Department in the year prior to our study (1969), 4 homicides were recorded only one year later. In a city which characteristically has a relatively low incidence of homicide (114 cases in 1970 with a population of 641,071), it is pertinent that nearly 4% of these homicides occurred in D Street, which contains only .6% of the total city population. These figures indicate, then, that the most serious crime of all, criminal homicide, is a part of life in D Street as well.

* * *

If properly implemented, the proposals put forward in this section can mitigate some of the harsher features of life in D Street. It is of the utmost importance, however, that we recognize the limitations of these or any other short-range, narrowly defined proposals. The problem of D Street is, in a real sense, that it exists.

It is impossible to avoid coming to the conclusion that much of the crime and other related social ills which exist in D Street, and in American society generally, are the consequences of fundamental structural conditions which produce a continuing maldistribution of income and wealth. Despite a general rise in living standards over the years, relative income shares remain unaltered, which means that the absolute dollar gap between families at the bottom and the top grows each year.[15] Historically, we have responded to those at the bottom by creating programs, institutions, and agencies to deal specifically and separately with the "have-nots." Public housing projects are only the most extreme example of this "separatist" policy, involving as it does the physical demarcation of the poor.

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[15] Letitia Upton and Nancy Lyons, Basic Facts: Distribution of Personal Income and Wealth in the United States, May, 1972, p.4.

In fiscal 1972, 168 federal programs directed at the poor and near-poor cost $31,000,000,000--yes, 31 billion dollars! Yet most of the programs fail the poor, and only a small portion of this money actually finds its way into the pockets of poor people. Why, then, does the country continue programs and policies which appear not to work? The answer is that the programs do work, but for the wrong people--real estate speculators, big and small businessmen, bureaucrats--everyone, that is, except the poor. And government policy which constrains the economically marginal to live among others who also have limited resources produces the very situation which helps to maintain the current system--the poor exploit and manipulate each other for the scarce goods that may be available, while generally accepting the society's cultural definition that they are failures not entitled to a larger proportion of the nation's income. The "community" which results maintains only the most tenuous control over its members; rather, it facilitates the extensive damage, destruction, thefts, and assaults we have witnessed perpetuated by D Streeters against their neighbors. Ironically, one element of social control for the poor, expressed by many of our respondents, is the belief that things could be even worse--they could live in even more undesirable housing projects (e.g., Columbia Point or Mission Hill).

It is well enough known that opportunities for legitimate success are not distributed equally across the American population. What is less widely recognized is that the level of crime in America is more closely related to opportunity structure than to varying rigors of law enforcement. It is certainly startling to note that surveys conducted by the Census Bureau in neighborhoods of 51 large urban areas indicate that 60 per cent of all workers did not earn enough to maintain a decent standard of living and 30 per cent did not even earn a poverty-level income.[17] The consequences of high subemployment and unemployment necessarily result in economic crime. We have observed the striking and disproportionately high number of young males that currently are growing up in D Street. It is urged that tutoring and high school work-study programs, job-training facilities, and employment programs focus their resources on D Street youths so that these youths will be better equipped to earn a decent standard of living legitimately.

Assuming there will be no full-scale redistribution of income in the United States in the near future, it is proposed, as a realistic alternative, that the government get completely out of public housing, either by giving the poor cash housing allowances or by augmenting present subsidized housing programs. Either policy would have a multitude of benefits: (1) Freedom

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[17] William Spring, Bennett Harrison and Thomas Vietorisz, "Crisis of the Underemployed," The New York Sunday Times Magazine, November 5, 1972.

of choice, which promotes a commitment to and interest in one's surroundings; (2) minimal stigmatization of the poor; and (3) an increase in the dispersal and assimilation of the poor into the rest of society. Direct cash allowances have a particularly attractive feature, however, of utilization of existing housing exclusively, which avoids objections to new housing developments by existing residents.

In August, 1970, a cash allowance policy, applicable to both rental and home purchases, was experimentally introduced in six metropolitan areas. Participating families were required to be in need of decent housing and to pay a reasonable percentage of their income for it. In a follow-up of 170 families from Kansas City, one of the pilot project areas, nearly 90% reported that direct housing allowances were better than public housing. It is true that 14 families were terminated due to rent delinquencies and that some 10 to 15 families left without notice, but certainly the success rate seems remarkably high thus far.

Given the failure of most Boston family housing projects (and the fact that it was a senator from Massachusetts, Edward Brooke, who introduced the 1970 Housing Act which created the rent allowance experiment), it is urged that Boston direct its public housing policy toward the implementation of both direct rent allowances and the expansion of subsidized housing.

Our goal must not be the provision of certain numbers of living units, but the achievement by each of our citizens of a safe and decent place in which to live.

APPENDIX I


B Street
D Street
West Seventh Street
West Broadway
Orton-Marotta Way
Flaherty Way
Crowley-Rogers Way
Joyce Hayes Way
Dalessio Court
Linskey-Barry Court
Rectory
Church
Parochial School
Public School
Administration Building
Parking Area
8
12
8
13
6
18
12
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11

Of the 407 crime descriptions collected from the victims in our sample, 385 (95%) were reported to have occurred in D Street; 11 (5%) were reported to have occurred a few blocks from D Street, and another 11 (5%) to have occurred more than a few blocks from D Street but in Boston. No crimes were reported to have occurred during the year outside of Boston. These incidents are distributed among the following crime categories:

Crimes Which Occurred to D Streeters Outside of D Street

Crimes	Few Blocks From D Street	More Than A Few Blocks From D Street But In Boston
Car Theft	3	0
Attempted Car Theft	2	0
Larceny Inside of Car	2	1
Larceny of Auto Accessories	1	0
Larceny from the Person	1	4
Other Larceny	0	1
Assault and/or Battery	2	4
Robbery	0	1
Total	11	11


WEST SEVENTH STREET